Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales

WORKING PAPER 21

CYPRUS--VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE:

A SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE AND WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS NOVEMBER 1988 TO JUNE 1989

by François Lafrenière
and Robert Mitchell

March 1990

WORKING PAPER 21

CYPRUS--VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE:

A SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE AND WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS NOVEMBER 1988 TO JUNE 1989

by François Lafrenière
and Robert Mitchell

March 1990

For more copies, please write:

360 Albert Street, Suite 900
Ottawa, Ontario
K1R 7X7

ISBN 0-662-17410-0

90-06510/

PREFACE

Working Papers, the result of research work in progress or the summary of a conference, are often intended for later publication by the Institute or another publisher, and are regarded by the Institute to be of immediate value for distribution in limited numbers -- mostly to specialists in the field. Unlike all other Institute publications, these papers are published only in the original language.

The opinions contained in the papers are those of the participants and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

François Lafrenière was research assistant for the Cyprus Research Project. Robert Mitchell was a former fellow at the Institute.

DEDICATION

This report is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Norma Salem, Research Associate of the Institute and head of the Cyprus project, who passed away in January 1990 at a tragically young age. She leaves a son, Omer.

Dr. Salem joined the Institute in September 1988 at a time when the Cyprus study, after several months of preparation in the steering committee, was moving into high gear. She was given responsibility for leading this endeavour, and did so over the following period with great skill, commitment and sensitivity to the issues. She headed an enquiry which brought more than sixty distinguished Canadian and international experts to a succession of workshops and a seminar in Ottawa, and which is generally regarded as being one of the Institute's most innovative and successful undertakings.

Dr. Salem carried forward her work even while fighting serious, and worsening, illness. Her courage, dedication and capabilities will not be forgotten by her colleagues or by those who worked with her on the Cyprus study and other projects.

Roger Hill
Director of Research

DÉDICACE

Le présent rapport est dédié à la mémoire de M^me^ Norma Salem, qui était chargée de recherche à l'Institut et chef du projet de Chypre; elle est décédée en janvier 1990, alors qu'elle était encore très jeune, et elle laisse son fils Omer dans le deuil.

M^me^ Salem est arrivée à l'Institut en septembre 1988 à un moment où l'étude sur Chypre démarrait vraiment, après plusieurs mois de préparation au sein du comité directeur. On lui a confié la direction du projet, et elle s'est ensuite acquittée de son rôle avec brio et dévouement, en se montrant extrêmement sensible aux divers aspects des questions étudiées. Elle a dirigé une enquête à laquelle ont participé plus de soixante éminents experts canadiens et étrangers, dans le cadre d'un colloque et d'une série d'ateliers qui ont eu lieu à Ottawa et qui, ensemble, ont constitué une des entreprises les plus novatrices et les mieux réussies de l'Institut.

M^me^ Salem a poursuivi sa tâche, même quand la maladie l'affligeait gravement. Ses collègues et tous ceux et celles qui ont travaillé avec elle au projet de Chypre et à d'autres entreprises n'oublieront pas son courage, son dévouement et ses grandes compétences.

Le Directeur de la recherche,

Roger Hill

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes a year-long Institute research project on the Cyprus problem. The project included three workshops -- November 1988, February 1989 and April 1989 -- and culminated in a seminar in June 1989. More than sixty participants attended the final seminar, including senior advisors, municipal leaders, and experts from Cyprus itself.

The goals of this project were:

- to provide deeper understanding of the issues and dynamics of a difficult regional conflict;
- to examine Cyprus as an example of nation-building in a bi-communal context;
- to consider the Cyprus situation as a case study in peacekeeping and peacemaking;
- to develop options for increased economic cooperation, political reconciliation and regional stability.

Participants focused their discussions on future developments rather than past problems. They reached a consensus on the need for the two communities to work together in order to build a common Cypriot political identity. It was agreed that economic and political confidence-building measures between the two communities should be encouraged and broadened.

Participants stressed the continuing importance of UNFICYP (the United Nations Force in Cyprus) and the UN Secretary-General's efforts to promote a settlement. They recommended various measures to strengthen the impact of these efforts: eg, waiting for evidence of progress towards a settlement before soliciting more contributions toward UNFICYP; starting negotiations to renew the mandate of UNFICYP well before expiry of old mandate; and possibly changing UNFICYP into more of an observer force with a quick-reaction capability.

Participants were encouraged by the recent and continuing negotiations between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. They noted, however, that there was still no consensus on the benefits that might flow from an accord, nor whether those benefits might be outweighed by possible costs.

Participants agreed that building a common Cypriot political identity is both possible and desirable. It was suggested that two strong cultural identities need not impede the building of a common Cypriot political identity. A first step might be to revise the textbooks, ridding them of negative stereotypes. It was agreed that systematic, informal contacts between the communities, on a person-to-person basis, would be needed.

In 1992 a united, stronger Europe might provide a multi-ethnic framework within which a federal Cyprus could flourish as a unit with two sub-national entities. If a mutually agreed federal solution were found, Cyprus could act as a model for the solution of other ethnic conflicts. More specifically, it would probably become a full member of the European Community.

At the final seminar, various recommendations were put forward:

- enhanced internal trade;
- reopening of the Nicosia International airport, initially under UN jurisdiction;
- the creation of economic commissions to study cooperative projects.

Some participants also supported a recommendation favouring free movement of labour.

Economic cooperation between the two communities was seen as a way to heal the hostile division of the island. Economic links would act as confidence-building measures, laying the foundation for eventual political settlement. Post-settlement economic cooperation would continue the development of normalized relations between the two communities. Some participants were concerned that economic confidence-building measures might signal acceptance of, if not a legitimization of, the status quo. While noting this point, most participants predicted that the benefits would outweigh the risks.

CONDENSÉ

Le présent rapport résume le projet de recherche mené par l'Institut pendant un an sur le problème de Chypre. Dans le cadre de ce projet, trois ateliers ont été organisés (novembre 1988, février 1989 et avril 1989), et un colloque final a eu lieu en juin 1989. Plus de soixante personnes ont participé à ce dernier, dont d'importants conseillers, des dirigeants municipaux et d'autres spécialistes venus de Chypre même.

Le projet avait pour but :

- de favoriser une meilleure compréhension des différents aspects et de la dynamique d'un conflit régional délicat;

- à partir de l'exemple de Chypre, d'examiner le problème de l'édification d'une nation dans un pays partagé par deux communautés; de faire de la situation de Chypre une étude de cas pour les initiatives de maintien et d'édification de la paix;

- de voir comment on pourrait renforcer la coopération économique et favoriser la réconciliation politique et la stabilité régionale.

Les participant(e)s ont concentré l'essentiel de leurs discussions sur les événements à venir plutôt que sur les problèmes du passé. Ils (elles) se sont entendu(e)s sur la nécessité, pour les deux communautés en présence, d'unir les efforts pour créer une identité politique chypriote commune. Il a été décidé d'encourager et d'élargir les mesures économiques et politiques propres à accroître la confiance entre les deux communautés.

Les participant(e)s ont souligné le rôle toujours aussi important de la FNUC (Force des Nations-Unies à Chypre) et les efforts déployés par le Secrétaire général pour faciliter un règlement. Ils (elles) ont recommandé diverses mesures qui permettraient de rendre ces efforts plus efficaces : par exemple, ne plus solliciter de contributions pour le financement de la FNUC, avant d'avoir des preuves qu'on progresse effectivement vers un règlement; entamer des négociations pour renouveler le mandat de la FNUC bien avant l'expiration du mandat actuel et, enfin, envisager peut-être de modifier la FNUC pour en faire plutôt une force d'observation dotée d'une capacité de réaction rapide.

Les participant(e) se sont dits encouragé(e)s par les récentes négociations qui se poursuivent entre les chefs des communautés chypriotes grecque et turque, sous les auspices du Secrétaire général de l'ONU. Ils (elles) ont toutefois souligné qu'il n'y avait toujours pas de consensus sur les avantages éventuels d'un accord, ni sur la question de savoir si les coûts de l'entente risquent de l'emporter sur ces avantages.

De l'avis des participant(e)s, l'édification d'une identité politique cnypriote commune est non seulement possible, mais aussi souhaitable. Ils (elles) ont laissé entendre que la présence de ces deux identités culturelles fortes ne constituait pas nécessairement un obstacle à l'émergence de cette identité commune. Ainsi, on pourrait commencer par réviser les manuels scolaires pour les débarrasser des stéréotypes négatifs qu'ils contiennent. Enfin, les participant(e)s se sont entendu(e)s sur la nécessité de nouer, entre les deux communautés, des contacts personnels réguliers et informels.

L'avènement, en 1992, d'une Europe unie et plus forte pourrait fournir un cadre multi-ethnique propice à l'épanouissement d'une île de Chypre fédérale, avec ses deux entités subnationales. Si les parties en présence s'entendaient sur une formule fédérale négociée, Chypre pourrait servir de modèle pour le règlement d'autres conflits ethniques. En particulier, l'île deviendrait probablement membre à part entière de la Communauté européenne.

À l'occasion du colloque final, diverses recommandations ont été formulées :

- augmenter le commerce interne;
- rouvrir l'aéroport international de Nicosie, en le plaçant en un premier temps sous la coupe de l'ONU;
- créer des commissions économiques pour étudier des projets de coopération.

Certain(e)s participant(e)s se sont également déclaré(e)s favorables à une recommandation préconisant la libre circulation de la main-d'oeuvre. D'autres ont dit voir dans la coopération économique entre les deux communautés un remède à la partition hostile de Chypre. Les liens économiques contribueraient à accroître la confiance mutuelle, ce qui ouvrirait la voie à un éventuel règlement politique. Une fois ce règlement intervenu, la

poursuite de la coopération économique favoriserait l'établissement de relations normalisées entre les deux communautés. Certain(e)s participant(e)s ont dit craindre que ces mesures de confiance économiques soient interprétées comme une acceptation du statu quo, sinon comme une façon de le légitimer. Quoique conscient(e)s de cet aspect du problème, la plupart des participant(e)s ont prédit que les avantages l'emporteraient largement sur les risques.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND 1

INTRODUCTION 5

THEME I - NATION-BUILDING IN A BICOMMUNAL CONTEXT 9

Overview 9
Social and Political Origins of the Conflict 9
Constitution and Government Organization 12
Communal and Domestic Politics 14
Preconditions for a Viable Federal System 18
Reconciliation and a Cypriot Political Identity 23
Session Summary 27
Final Workshop Consideration 28
Final Workshop Report 30

THEME II - CYPRUS AS A REGIONAL PROBLEM WITH GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS 33

Overview 33
A Social-Psychological Analysis 33
The Great Powers and Cyprus 35
Cyprus in Regional Politics 39
Cyprus and the Impact of Elections in Greece and Turkey 43
The European Community and the Cyprus Conflict 46
Session Summary 48
Final Workshop Consideration 49
Final Workshop Report 51

THEME III - PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING 53

Overview 53
The Canadian Interest in Cyprus 53
The Record of the United Nations 55
Conflict Management: Theory and Application 59
Cypriot Perceptions 62
The Future Role of the United Nations 64
Session Summary 67
Final Workshop Consideration 67
Final Workshop Report 70

THEME IV - ECONOMICS AND PEACEBUILDING 71

Overview 71
Economic Aspects of Communal Conflict 71
Working at Cooperation 75
The Economic Potential of Cyprus 78
Session Summary 84
Final Workshop Consideration 84
Final Workshop Report 87

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 89

APPENDIX I - WORKSHOP AND SEMINAR PROGRAMMES 93

APPENDIX II - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS [ALPHABETICALLY] 105

BACKGROUND

The Research Division of the Institute for Peace and Security undertook a comprehensive project during 1988 and 1989 to examine aspects of the problem of Cyprus.

Aim

The aim of the project was to provide, at a minimum, a deeper understanding of the issues and dynamics of a regional conflict situation. It was hoped, however, that it might also be possible to develop options, recommendations and areas of cooperative investigation which could lead to a framework for increased economic cooperation, political reconciliation and enhanced regional stability.

Objectives

More specifically, the project had four objectives. The first was to provide a balanced and comprehensive overview of the origins and the background of the situation on Cyprus in the context of both a communal and regional framework. The second was to conduct a multidisciplinary analysis of implemented and proposed peacekeeping, mediation, economic and constitutional options. From this analysis, the third objective was to consider future proposals which offered the best promise of overcoming the apparent deadlock and intractability of the status quo and the continuing division of the island. The fourth objective was to make documentation from the project available in a variety of formats for the purposes of scholarship, public discussion and policy consideration.

Methodology

Beginning in November 1988, the project participants conducted a series of three workshops using the Institute's conference facilities. A concluding seminar drawing together the results of these workshops was held at the Skyline Hotel, Ottawa, from 29 to 30 June 1989. Papers presented at the workshops were selected to form the research base for the seminar. Incorporated in the seminar were a set of brief workshops which were designed to consolidate the work of previous workshops and project ideas into the future.

An important aspect of this work was its multi-disciplinary approach. Historical analyses provided an understanding of the background causes of the conflict. Socio-psychological insights provided the foundation for considering the basic human needs and perceptions associated with protracted conflicts. Both theoretical and practical aspects of mediation and conflict resolution were addressed. Discussion of constitutions and federal structures was designed both to develop an understanding of the collapse of the 1960 Cypriot constitution and also to provide alternative models for consideration in the Cypriot context. Economic analyses pointed to the advantages of cooperation in business and government and the creation of common interests.

Scholarly presentations were balanced by a wide range of comments from other sources. Other participants included military officers associated with peacekeeping, journalists, United Nations officials, engineers, municipal authorities, governmental advisors and influential private citizens.

The project was international in scope with participants from Canada, the United States, Turkey, Greece, France, Great Britain, India, and Chile as well as both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

Steering Committee

The project was led by Dr. Norma Salem, in coordination with a Steering Committee which included Institute staff. A major concern of the project was the need to involve Cypriots, of both the Greek and the Turkish communities as active participants rather than objects of the study. The Steering Committee therefore included Canadians of Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Greek and Turkish origins as well as Canadians with backgrounds in peacekeeping.

The Steering Committee took an active role in lending support to the project leader. All major decisions regarding structure, papers, schedule and participation were approved by the Committee. The Committee reviewed in detail all reports and proceedings to ensure a balanced and consistent approach. Individual papers nonetheless reflected the views of the author and not necessarily those of either the Institute or of the Steering Committee.

The members of the Steering Committee are:

Roger Hill, Director of Research
François Lafrenière, Research Assistant
Ozay Mehmet, Professor, Carleton University
Robert Mitchell, Colonel, Canadian Armed Forces and Senior Research Fellow
Stelios Pneumaticos, Director, Solar Energy Division, Energy, Mines and Resources
Norma Salem, Research Associate
Kevser Taymaz, Senior Analytical Advisor, Laboratory and Scientific Services, Directorate, Revenue Canada Customs and Excise
Dean Wellsman, Colonel (Ret'd) Canadian Armed Forces
Basil Zafiriou, Senior Analyst, Library of Parliament

François Lafrenière prepared the initial drafts of the reports for the three workshops and the seminar. Robert Mitchell prepared the final draft of the overall report. Without the help of the support staff, the project could not have been undertaken. Doina Cioiu handled the logistics and supervised the secretarial work done by Chantale Beaudoin.

This report constitutes a summary of the discussions that took place during the three workshops and the seminar. Not all participants would necessarily agree with all the points covered here, or even with the general conclusions. However, this report attempts to summarize the primary perspectives, along with some of the key dissenting views. The programmes and the list of participants are appended.

The views expressed in this report are those of the individual participants and do not necessarily reflect the views of members of the steering committee. The Introduction and Conclusions were prepared by Institute staff who are solely responsible for these summary descriptions.

INTRODUCTION*

Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean is situated 75 kilometres from the coast of Turkey, 100 kilometres from Syria and 400 kilometres West of the Greek island of Rhodes. This strategic maritime location adjacent to the Fertile Crescent has resulted in a turbulent history as a succession of empires sought control of Cyprus. Britain assumed control of Cyprus from the Ottoman Sultan in 1878 and administered it as a colony with limited self government. At the time of independence in 1960 the population of Cyprus was roughly 80 percent of Greek heritage and 18 percent of Turkish heritage with the remainder being Maronites, Armenians or Latins.

The majority Greek Cypriot population under the leadership of the independent Cypriot Orthodox Church had traditionally favoured enosis, the inclusion of Cyprus in a Greek state. In reaction to the movement for enosis, Turkish Cypriots promoted the idea of taksim, partition of the island.

By the 1950s British colonial administrators found it increasingly difficult to reconcile Britain's strategic interests in the Mediterranean, the geographic position of Cyprus, the interests of the Turkish community and the enosis sentiments of the Greek Cypriots. Beginning in 1955, Britain was faced with a protracted guerrilla war led by EOKA (Ethnike Organosis Kyprion Agoniston) whose objectives were to end colonial status and to achieve enosis with Greece. Britain concluded that its interests could best be served by retaining only portions of the island as bases. A compromise was therefore sought to satisfy both the enosis sentiments favoured by the majority of Greek Cypriots and supported by Greece, as well as the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community and the strategic interests of Turkey.

---

* Much of the material in this introduction is taken from the Institute publication, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus," Background Paper no. 23, by Robert Mitchell.

The compromise was a unique partnership experiment in both constitutional structure and sovereignty. Cyprus was constituted as an independent republic thus precluding both enosis and taksim. The Turkish Cypriots were granted functional equality with the Greek Cypriots through fixed proportioning of government functions on a communal basis. The President was to be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot, both with veto powers. Britain retained two sovereign bases and small Greek and Turkish garrisons were permitted on the island. These arrangements were formalized in four documents signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960: The Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee (signed by Britain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus), the Treaty of Alliance (signed by Greece, Turkey and Cyprus) and the Constitution.

The compromise appeared reasonably satisfactory for the guaranteeing powers (Britain, Greece and Turkey). It seemed to resolve regional issues and to protect all communities on Cyprus. The limitations on sovereignty which were imposed on the fledgling state were regarded by the guaranteeing powers as minor inconveniences to be accepted for the common good.

The constitutional arrangements, however, proved difficult to implement. It was impossible to agree on a number of administrative issues. In addition, many Greek Cypriots resented the preclusion of enosis by what they considered undemocratic constitutional provisions. Because the constitution also precluded taksim, many Turkish Cypriots retained a feeling of insecurity, if not distrust, of the intentions of the majority Greek Cypriot population. The resulting political estrangement led to a series of constitutional crises which by the end of 1963 resulted in intercommunal fighting paralyzing the government. Efforts to reconcile the two communities failed; then, with the creation of local paramilitary forces, communal violence increased.

A temporary truce was arranged between communal factions in the Nicosia area and a ceasefire line, the Green Line, was established by the end of December 1964. The situation, however, continued to deteriorate and on 4 March 1964, the Security Council of the United Nations unanimously adopted Resolution 186 authorizing the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The force was to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and the restoration of normal conditions.

The government of Cyprus agreed to the formation of UNFICYP, which was to be present for three months.

By the spring of 1974, the intercommunal talks, progressing slowly since 1968, had produced a package deal which balanced a degree of Turkish community autonomy with modifications to some of the separate status provisions of the 1960 constitution.

On 15 July 1974, however, the Cypriot National Guard, under the control of its Greek officers, staged a coup, but failed to kill President Makarios. On 20 July, Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus, claiming the unilateral rights of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee as justification. The Greek-backed regime, which had been set up after the coup, collapsed at the same time as the military junta in Athens fell.

On 16 August, with the Turkish army controlling approximately the northern forty percent of the island, a general ceasefire was achieved. The Security Council authorized UNFICYP to carry out duties relating to the maintenance of the ceasefire and called for an end to foreign intervention in the Republic of Cyprus.

Twenty-five years after its establishment the force remains in existence and the conflict in Cyprus remains unresolved. During that period Canada has sent successive contingents to serve with UNFICYP. Canada and Cyprus are members of the Commonwealth. Along with Greece and Turkey, Canada is a member of NATO. As an officially bilingual and multicultural state, Canada sympathizes with the efforts of others to build pluralist structures. There is therefore a strong Canadian interest in the promotion of an equitable and enduring solution to the Cyprus conflict.

OUTLINE OF PROJECT

The project sought to incorporate a distinct Canadian perspective on the issue. Like Cyprus, Canada is a bicommunal state and thus may have practical experience to share in the area of nation-building. As a fellow NATO ally, Canada has an incentive to promote the resolution of this regional conflict. In the area of peacekeeping, Canada has, for twenty-five years, supported the United Nations Force in Cyprus. In addition, Canada would like to see this peacekeeping broadened to include peacemaking and

peacebuilding. Based on the many facets of this Canadian perspective, the workshops were organized to incorporate four major themes:

1. **Cyprus as an example of nation-building in a bicommunal context**

2. **Cyprus as a regional problem with global implications**

3. **Peacekeeping and peacemaking**

4. **Economics and peacebuilding**

THEME I - NATION-BUILDING IN A BICOMMUNAL CONTEXT

OVERVIEW

Almost forty percent of the formal sessions of the project were devoted to the consideration of aspects of this theme. The rationale for this derived from one of the original project aims which was to provide a comprehensive analysis in a readily accessible form for area briefings and general discussion. The progressive and cooperative nature of the Workshops also required a common base from which to develop visions for the future. A total of ten sessions were allocated to the topic and were distributed across the three Workshops and the concluding Seminar.

The sessions were structured to maintain a balance between historical analysis, legal constitutional interpretations, the ongoing dynamics of contemporary politics and the possible evolution of a Cypriot political identity. A comparative session on federal systems provided Canadian parallels and other insights into the implications of the suggested federal solution for Cyprus.

Papers and discussion have been organized in the following subject areas:

a. social and political origins of the conflict;
b. constitution and government organization;
c. communal and domestic politics;
d. preconditions for a viable federal system; and
e. reconciliation and a Cypriot political identity.

1. Social and Political Origins of the Conflict

William Dobell in his paper Cyprus as a Regional Conflict suggested that the Cyprus situation was the result of ongoing regional rivalries involving actors such as Greece, Turkey, the Arab-Israeli World, NATO and the UN. The US and USSR were not considered regional actors as such. He argued that the perception of Cyprus as a locus of regional conflict had a long history. There was limited justification for it remaining so, given the diminished strategic value of Cypriot military bases.

Dobell cited Greece's cultural and ethnic links with the majority of Cypriots as the primary reason for its interest in the island. Greece's sporadic support for enosis was the result of government instability and lack of military power. Turkey's interests stemmed from centuries of rule of the island and shared ethnic links with the Turkish Cypriot community. Dobell described Turkey's policies on Cyprus as resulting primarily from concerns for the protection of this minority. He also saw historic-religious linkages, solidarity with the Palestinian territorial losses, and geographic proximity with the Middle East as creating possible spill-over effects in the Cyprus conflict. Although the strategic value of the British military bases had diminished, they remained important for NATO. By contrast, the UN is mainly concerned with internal conflict between the two Cypriot communities and is maintaining a predominant role in both peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts in Cyprus.

Dobell identified two factors as changing the regional context of the Cyprus problem. The first was the 1974 Turkish intervention which had resulted in territorial redistribution and communal separation on the island. Although Cypriot leadership elites remain largely unchanged, Dobell felt that the changes in leadership which had taken place in the Republic of Cyprus (Vassiliou) and in the USSR (Gorbachev) represented a second factor which, together with a new positive spirit developing in Greece/Turkey relations, could lead to a UN-sponsored compromise.

Tozun Bahceli in critiquing Dobell's paper emphasized the importance of the communal aspects of the Cyprus conflict, suggesting that the literature on the topic had generally underestimated local forces. The enosis pressures of Greek Cypriots on mainland Greece and the strategic interest of Turkey in Cyprus were also singled out as missing from the analysis. Dobell answered that the paper tried to differentiate between reality and perception on these issues. Bahceli also thought that the Arab-Israeli conflict was not a significant factor in Cyprus. He did not agree with Dobell that the US and USSR had no direct interests in Cyprus.

Costas Melakopides thought the treatment of the regional actors involved in the conflict left the impression that forces determined by obscure causes were at play. He felt that the US role, particularly its relations with the Greek junta, merited further

investigation. Dobell felt that the influence of the US actions, both overt and covert, was overestimated when compared with the Greek junta's recklessness.

Discussion turned from differing perceptions of the US role to a communal focus. Mehmet Kadir began with a passionate description of his personal experience of inter-communal rivalries in Cyprus, emphasizing the importance of security for the Turkish Cypriots. Other participants of Greek Cypriot origin were equally passionate in describing their own experiences. Several speakers observed that this sad historical heritage and the twenty-five years of communal separation had created significant distortions in the perception each party had of the other.

Participants drew parallels between Canada and Cyprus: the dynamics of minority-majority issues and the role of federalism as a settlement structure. Dobell's reference to Lord Durham's "two nations" in Canada was considered particularly appropriate. Some argued that differences between Cyprus and Canada (size, regional influences) might reduce the validity of Canadian options if applied to Cyprus.

James Travers provided a contemporary focus to the historical analysis. He did so by examining the dangers of separation and by emphasizing the need to put the past behind, and not to constantly describe it. Using his personal experience as a journalist posted in Cyprus, he described how surprisingly distorted and out of focus was the perception that some members of the two communities had of the difficulties of living on the other side. He suggested that visitors from outside were often bombarded with the issue of "the" problem in Cyprus. Even in casual conversations, the subject could be avoided only with considerable difficulty. He also thought that, although there was a general mood favouring international conflict resolution in the world, each community in Cyprus found considerable comfort in the separation. He suggested that this acceptance of the status quo remained the single greatest obstacle to some form of reunification. Greek Cypriots enjoy a healthy economy and Turkish Cypriots prize their present security, even if it means not being able to share the economic growth.

Travers went on to say that Sweden's decision to leave UNFICYP could be seen in the light of the argument that peacekeeping has meant separation and status quo, which has in itself made any solution more difficult. Referring to the case of the bicommunal tourist resort of Pyla, he argued that any solution imposed from the outside was bound

to fail. Travers foresaw a slow process involving joint economic ventures as perhaps the only way, if any, to a solution. The main problem remained one of mistrust, and this had to be tackled before a comprehensive structure of settlement could succeed.

Answering a comment by Melakopides on the tendency to try to seek a solution while ignoring the past, Travers recognized that historical events should not be ignored, but also said that they should not be used as an excuse for not going forward. He added that his posting in Nicosia had made his views far more even-handed over time. Travers also agreed with Dean Wellsman that the UN peacekeeping finances had been a predominant issue in the Swedish withdrawal from UNFICYP. Commenting on the financial difficulties of peacekeeping in general (including UNFICYP), Indar Rikhye thought the US-USSR rapprochement could help build a new era of cooperation in the funding of UN peacekeeping forces.

Participants generally agreed that pragmatic economic intercommunal ventures were often neglected because of the highly legalistic approach commonly present in intercommunal talks in Cyprus. Some insisted that the economic, military or political debate should not overshadow the fundamental social-psychological problems.

2. Constitution and Government Organization

Norma Salem, in her paper entitled The Constitution of Cyprus, contrasted two perceptions of the 1960 Constitution. The scholars who support the Greek Cypriot position argue that the constitution was inherently unworkable and imposed upon Cyprus from the outside. Those who support the Turkish Cypriot position think it was a fine constitution which the two communities could have worked out together.

Salem examined the strong bicommunal character of the various sections of the 1960 Constitution. Both the Executive Branch and the House of Representatives were clearly divided along community lines. The judicial system, public services, army and police forces were also to be divided according to strict ratios. This core assumption of the Constitution even reached radio and television broadcasting. Salem identified several problems, including the inability of the system to enforce the ratio in the public services, and the inability of the two leaders to reach a compromise on the structure of the national army. The culmination of bicommunal stalemates was the breakdown of the

Supreme Court along ethnic lines. The thirteen constitutional amendments proposed by Makarios in November 1963 were never implemented. Intercommunal fighting broke out and joint communal government collapsed. Consequently, the two communities evolved separately despite UN-sponsored efforts to reconcile the parties. The 1974 Turkish intervention was the culmination of the process and effectively left Cyprus a de facto bi-zonal entity. Salem concluded by contrasting two possible approaches to a solution--a local solution, worked out by Cypriot leaders, and a global option worked out and even perhaps imposed by the UN.

In his comments on the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, Albert Breton drew distinctions between constitutional order, "the rules of the game," and political order, "the game itself." He argued that a constitution should be the stabilizing element in a changing political environment. Hence, it should be written in terms broad enough to adapt to change and to foster consensus. This process requires an independent judicial body to interpret the text of the Constitution and act as a moderating force on the political environment. Specifically referring to Salem's description of Cyprus' Constitution, Breton thought the 1960 Constitution was too rigid, too specific and too comprehensive. He was especially critical of the strict ethnic requirements embodied in the Constitution.

Breton described a competitive model of federalism where the federal (central) state regulates competition between the regional entities. Empirical studies seem to demonstrate that the smaller the number of partners in a federation, the more it is prone to instability. Important differences in the size of each of the partners also made the federation more unstable. One of the solutions envisaged by Breton for Cyprus was to defuse the rivalry by splitting the two sides into a larger number of units. He admitted, however, that he did not know if this was feasible in Cyprus.

Ali-Fuat Borovali cautioned against generalization when dealing with specific constitutions or federations, adding that there was perhaps a "fitting" constitution for each given political order. Examples (Yugoslavia, etc.) and counter-examples (Australia, Belgium) were mentioned in an attempt to emphasize the concept of specificity over the argument of generalization.

Several participants questioned the negative assessment of bi-lateral arrangements given by Breton. Both Ron Fisher and Roger Hill reacted to Breton's comments by suggesting that binary situations were not necessarily inherently unworkable, and that in many cases the conflict did not stem only from the binary nature of the problem. Bahceli emphasized the importance of the local political situation in Cyprus, including bicommunalism, as underlying the failure of the constitution. Reference was made to the millet system, prevalent under the Ottoman Empire, as a stable arrangement favouring the coexistence of multiple communities. Others argued that such a system of religious communal responsibility for governing behaviour could not cope with the social and political demands of modern society. The entry of Cyprus and Turkey into the European Community (EC) was suggested as a way to dilute the bicommunal nature of the problem.

Participants nevertheless agreed that current polarization was along ethnic lines, and that there was a tendency for Cypriots to consider every problem as a Greek-Turkish problem. In this type of situation, Breton still felt that the key was to multiply and diversify the interests present in the discussions.

3. Communal and Domestic Politics

Before discussing Greek Cypriot politics, Van Coufoudakis felt that a general orientation was necessary to understand the evolution of party positions. Reviewing the events that led to the 1974 Turkish intervention, he underlined the psychological difficulties on the part of the Greek Cypriots in accepting the principle of a bicommunal, bi-zonal federation. Greek Cypriot refugees from northern areas of Cyprus were a potent political force and still put pressure on Greek Cypriot politicians with respect to the three freedoms of access, property and settlement.

Coufoudakis contrasted Makarios' goal of feasible unfettered independence with the unattainable, but traditionally more desirable, enosis. Makarios' successful leadership was due to the nationalist identity of the Orthodox Church, and his charismatic dominance of the political parties and factions. After Makarios' death, Kyprianou tried to pursue the same policies but eventually lost much of his support to an unusual communist/right wing coalition.

Coufoudakis also described the positions of the major Greek Cypriot parties. Clerides' conservative/right Democratic Rally supports the concept of a federal, independent, bi-zonal, bicommunal, non-aligned Republic. It also emphasizes that time is not in favour of Greek Cypriots. The position of AKEL (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou -- The Communist Party of Cyprus) resembles that of the Rally, and supports the internationalization of the problem, albeit without the US. AKEL also calls for the complete demilitarization of Cyprus. The smaller Socialist EDEK (Eniaia Democratike Enosis Kentrou) party accepts the principle of a federation, if it includes provisions for the return of the refugees, the respect of the three freedoms, a unified economy and the withdrawal of Turkish troops. Coufoudakis noted the agreement of all the major parties in opposing confederal solutions, borders between the two provinces and restrictions to the three freedoms. All these parties held public positions in support of the principles of a sovereign, territorially integral, bi-zonal federation, that would also be non-aligned and demilitarized.

Describing the rise of George Vassiliou, Coufoudakis referred to his lack of direct party connections although he did have the support of AKEL in the 1988 presidential election. Vassiliou has managed to maintain consensus on the Greek Cypriot side. The solution proposed in January 1989 by Vassiliou to the UN Secretary-General included the principles noted above and included support for UN resolutions and human rights covenants. It called for the elimination of unilateral rights of intervention, the creation of a bicameral legislature and the separation of powers between federal and provincial levels of government.

Referring to writings on the conflict resolution case study of Trieste, Coufoudakis suggested that many of the required conditions were already present in Cyprus. He recommended a solution based on UN resolution 3212 of 1974, and resolution 365 of 1983, as well as the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements. Coufoudakis concluded by reiterating the Greek Cypriot consensus on a federal, bi-zonal, bicommunal, independent, sovereign, territorially integral, non-aligned and demilitarized Cyprus, and cautioned against an easily achieved, but unstable, confederal solution.

Mümtaz Soysal's presentation on Turkish Cypriot politics focused on the fallacy of perceiving the leadership of Denktaş in northern Cyprus as one of a solidly based and uncontested strongman. His paper emphasized the growing diversity of political life and parties in the Turkish Cypriot community.

Like Coufoudakis, Soysal felt that current politics could not be isolated from the historical background. He described Turkish Cypriots as the heirs of the Ottoman bureaucracy and peasantry on the island. He argued that the rise of the Turkish Cypriot KTP (Turkish Party of Cyprus) was a response to the Greek Cypriot commercial elites' support of enosis. The fear of enosis and of EOKA led the KTP to promote the partition of the island. Soysal then argued that the bicommunal partnership, created with the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, was bound to fail, since President Makarios and Vice-President Küçük were at that time the leaders of the Greek Cypriot enosis movement and of the Turkish Cypriot taksim ideology, respectively.

The UBP (National Unity Party, a descendent of the KTP) was almost the only political entity existing in northern Cyprus after the 1974 Turkish intervention. A new political spectrum has since emerged. Soysal cited figures indicating that over 60 percent of the political and opinion-making leaders in northern Cyprus had lived through intercommunal disputes, and that this gave a consensual flavour to the solutions envisaged. This elite is nevertheless divided into various parties, with the UBP still being the main power (strongly supporting Denktaş). Other parties (often factions of the UBP) like the TKP (Communal Liberation Party), the HP (People's Party) and the CTP (Republican Turkish Party) all stand to the "left of centre." Since 1981, a new party founded by mainland immigrants, the YDP (Revival Party) is also part of the picture.

Soysal evaluated the views of the parties concerning a solution. He identified the right to administer their own affairs on their territory (under effective guarantee of Turkey) as a unanimously agreed upon position among Turkish Cypriot political leaders. The UBP and the immigrants' YDP both support a solution preserving the new reality created by the Turkish military intervention. Soysal assessed the other parties as preferring a federal (as opposed to confederal) solution but diverging on the type of federation envisaged, especially on the powers allocated to the federal government.

Citing figures on the views exposed by the Turkish Cypriot elite (divided by party affiliation), Soysal pointed out that, of the "21.8 percent [who] preferred the continuation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent state," UBP and YDP supporters formed the majority. TKP and CTP followers together constituted almost all the backing of the 39 percent of political elites favouring a federal solution. In conclusion, Soysal reiterated that even the most radical party (CTP) agreed with the consensus on the main principles of bi-zonality, political equality and an effective guarantee by Turkey.

Discussion opened with consideration of the degree of support enjoyed by federal solutions. Laipson questioned the consensus both speakers described as existing in the Greek Cypriot (on "bi-zonality") and Turkish Cypriot (on "effective guarantee" by Turkey) political communities. Coufoudakis said there was a consensus among Greek Cypriots to accept the term 'bi-zonal' if it did not include borders, while Soysal stated Turkish Cypriots wanted the concept of bi-zonality to represent a split in legitimate jurisdiction, not the image of a barbed-wire fence. Soysal also recognized that the presence of Turkish troops as part of an effective guarantee by Turkey was not part of the consensus among the various Turkish Cypriot parties. McDonald commented on the absence of unanimity among Turkish Cypriot political parties on the issue of the declaration of independence. He noted that some leaders of opposition parties in northern Cyprus had declared that their organizations had been threatened with dissolution if they did not publicly approve the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).

Commenting on Coufoudakis' description of concessions in the negotiating position of the Greek Cypriot leadership, John Halstead asked Soysal what, in Vassiliou's recent proposal, the Turkish Cypriots would find most difficult. Soysal identified the two major reservations as being first, the lack of definition of territorial integrity as opposed to Turkish Cypriot concepts of bi-zonality, and second, divergences about the role of Turkey as a guarantor.

Coufoudakis and Soysal agreed that mutual suspicion meant that both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were often using isolated portions of UN resolutions and declarations to legitimize their own positions in the current negotiations. Bahceli felt that Coufoudakis had over-emphasized external factors and understated internal ones. Coufoudakis acknowledged both internal and external causes but felt that the key issue

requiring consensus was not territorial but the definition of a federation for Cyprus. A distinction was also drawn between the qualitative concept of communities and the quantitative minority-majority definition.

Remaining discussion centred largely on questions of legitimacy, independence and recognition. Questions were raised concerning the apparent refusal by Turkish Cypriot authorities to allow intercommunal meetings. Soysal identified the problem as being primarily a question of appropriate recognition of Turkish Cypriot status and not an issue of freedom of movement.

4. Preconditions for a Viable Federal System

Alain Gagnon's presentation suggested that federalism was the political structure which had the best chance of solving problems associated with unification of multi-community states. In discussing concepts of federation and federalism, he identified five different approaches as follows:

a. the formal-legal formulation that deals more with federal government structures;
b. Livingston's approach which views federalism as a phenomenon of social diversity;
c. Friedrich and others who interpret federalism as a process rather than a design;
d. Burgess' approach which holds that federalism should be conceived as a classification; and
e. federalism as an ideology or to some extent as nationalism.

Gagnon argued that federalism should be seen as a means to manage conflict in terms of aggregate interest and force. Gagnon also discussed what he called the mobilization of bias. He cited the Canadian bias in favour of a sociological approach which has resulted in the aggregation of interest in territorial rather than class or other groupings.

Gagnon warned against viewing federalism as a means of consensus-building because of the conflictual relationships underlying the origin of any federal system. He identified the utility of conflict regulation and management as opposed to conflict resolution in a federal system. The attitude of political elites, the existence of a party system, the importance of territory were important factors in the conflict management capacities of a federal system. Economics was also an important factor because one region in a federal structure could represent a large proportion of one class (or have a lower economic situation). Gagnon therefore concluded that federalism could also reflect the interests of regional economic functions or other social cleavages. He emphasized that stability in a federal structure, however, did not mean integration. The aim he suggested was to remain able to manage conflict, not to eliminate differences.

Gagnon suggested that discussion of the major approaches to the study of comparative federalism has uncovered a variety of factors dealing with conflict management. Each approach has contributed to a better understanding of the nature of federalism, but some are more appropriate in accounting for the dynamics of conflict management than others. Gagnon felt that sociological approaches were the most appropriate but not to the extent of neglecting legal-formal structures.

Gagnon argued that an understanding of change in federal systems required a particular bias which recognized conflict as central and inherent in federal systems and appreciated the complex relationship among states, societal actors and government structures. The bias of stability in federal systems also tended to attenuate the conflictual nature inherent in society by emphasizing the adaptability of the federal system to crisis. Gagnon argued it was possible to see the federal and provincial governments as playing a non-zero-sum game by cooperating in a number of fields.

In his presentation, Robert Jackson noted that only a small minority of states were federal as opposed to unitary. He suggested that all federal constitutional arrangements had been designed to accommodate regional, ethnic, or other differences in a pluralistic state. In extreme cases of social cleavages, Jackson argued that only a federal model of union could succeed. He suggested that the behaviour of the elites and their attitudes concerning the degree of centralization was of foremost importance in the success of any constitutional arrangement.

Jackson discussed the territorial base for federalism, suggesting that wider notions of federalism existed, and that the Canadian experience was, like others, a specific case. A diversity in religion, language, ethnicity and religion is often associated with the pluralist nature of a federal state, although this diversity is almost always present in unitary states as well.

He argued that federalism could not be considered inherently appropriate or inappropriate for any particular society. It is the result of a regional political bargain where the elites have considered that there is more to gain by joining together than by maintaining separation. Jackson identified military security and economic and political expansion as possible motivations.

Jackson noted four conditions of failures in federal systems: regional divergences of political demand; weak communications; a diminution of the original impetus for union; and external influences. He argued these conditions were present at various degrees in all federal systems, even the ones which succeeded. He also emphasized that war had historically been the usual means by which federal states divide.

Discussing recent changes in the Canadian Constitution (1982 patriation, and the Meech Lake Accord), Jackson stated that he thought the Meech Lake Accord amendments were too decentralizing and unclear. The diminution of important federal powers weakens the central institution's ability to act as the referee of confederation. He observed that the Meech Lake Accord might possibly be more appropriate for Cyprus than for Canada.

Jean-Luc Pepin's presentation focused on the conditions for federalism, in the Canadian context. Pepin strongly emphasized the changing nature and uniqueness of the Canadian federal system. He argued that federal systems must be made to suit countries, and not the opposite.

Pepin defined the basics of a federal system: a single international entity, a written and rigid constitution, two orders of government, a division of competence, recognized processes and instruments of coordination and an accepted arbitrator. Given these basic elements, Pepin felt that they c[illegible] be adapted and modified in accordance

with local conditions and specific environments to create effective federal organizations. Pepin identified three categories of local factors: geo-cultural, psycho-philosophical and constitutional.

The geo-cultural factor usually favours diversity in a society. Physical, economic, and human geography, ethnicity, language and culture are all examples of this kind of diversity. This diversity influences the federal system through debate about how much diversity to incorporate in the constitutional arrangement. In Canada there is surprisingly little.

The second series of factors dealing with psycho-philosophical preconditions favour unity. Describing the circumstances that led the Canadian political and business elites, along with the clergy, to agree on a constitution in 1867, Pepin emphasized the psychological aspects of isolation, fear, tolerance, and a realistic sense of compromise.

Pepin underlined the overriding need for a constitutional document even if all disputes are not resolved. This document has to be drafted and agreed upon even if the signatories know full well it will have to be modified at some point in the future. There were three concerns present at the drafting of the Canadian constitution. The first was the division of powers with the federal government dealing with general matters and provinces dealing with regional and local matters. The second was the criterion of consensus, where the approval of both communities was sufficient to have a resolution adopted. The third Canadian concern has been the non-subordination of one order of government to the other.

Pepin outlined the changes that had occurred in the Canadian constitution, to illustrate how it had adapted over time to a specific Canadian context. This adaptation was followed by the building of traditions, in political and administrative processes, that had not been included in the constitution. The lesson, argued Pepin, was not to delay endlessly, in the hope of developing a perfect constitution, because initial arrangements will always have to adapt over time to changing circumstances.

General discussion opened with consideration of the necessity of intercommunal accommodation. Dobell noted that there was not an accommodation between the two communal elites in Cyprus. He suggested that Cypriots of both communities would

probably prefer non-federal solutions if they could be imposed. Leaders understood that the will of both communities to reach a bargain was a necessity for successful federalism. The same leaders had not necessarily acted upon this understanding. Dobell identified the unequal population ratio (worse than in Canada) and the absence of a constitutional Supreme Court in Cyprus as factors hindering the accommodation process. Pepin argued for imaginative and dedicated leaders in the construction of a federal agreement in Cyprus, while Jackson confirmed the need for the elites in the two Cypriot communities to see an advantage in joining together in a federal system.

John Sigler questioned the willingness of Greek Cypriots to assume the special responsibility of not behaving like a majority. This initiated a discussion on historical perspectives. Karpat's historical analysis of the failure of the federal and constitutional system in Cyprus suggested that Cyprus had been under a quasi-federal millet system for centuries. He identified the failure of the 1960 Constitution as the inability to achieve an effective accommodation on the issue of communal dominance. If the supremacy of one group over the other is maintained, federalism cannot succeed in Cyprus. Antoniades said that the parties in Cyprus had been so far apart it seemed difficult for the 1960 constitution not to fail. He said the Canadian examples of power-sharing and accommodation required a minimum of agreement and common understanding that were not yet present in Cyprus. Mehmet suggested that conflicting views of history perpetuated by education systems had distorted Cypriots' views of each other's behaviour, intent and motivations. He suggested that modification of texts and curricula would be needed to overcome these distortions. This would be an important step in creating the conditions favouring accommodation rather than confrontation.

Discussion concluded with consideration of some of the specifics of adaptation in the Canadian context. It was pointed out that the Meech Lake Accord would have been impossible to put forward without the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter, by putting the emphasis on the rights of the individuals instead of communities or provinces, effectively diluted the special status of Quebec. Gagnon underlined that the apparent consensual power agreements made in Canada were the result of a tough and protracted struggle on the part of Quebeckers, especially in the political, but also in the economic, field. Answering Jonah's comments on a just and equitable constitution, Gagnon also said that even in Canada federal compromises and constitutional amendments are not always just, although the Canadian federation does function. Pepin emphasized

the need to keep the constitution and federal bargain as simple as possible initially, reserving the fine tuning for subsequent negotiations.

5. Reconciliation and a Cypriot Political Identity

Adamantia Pollis questioned the wisdom of identifying the Cyprus conflict as inherent in the ethnic relations between Greeks and Turks. Instead, she suggested historical evidence indicated that the categories of religion, ethnicity and nationality were not fixed.

Pollis noted that Greek and Turkish Cypriot peasants had lived in mixed villages, not in segregated areas. Although for centuries Cypriot peasants had distinguished themselves as either Christian or Muslim, Pollis argued that they nonetheless often united against exploitative Greek and Turkish tax gatherers and other levels of authority. Religious identification used under the millet system did not acquire a political connotation until the divide-and-rule strategy of the British colonial system. The development of right wing nationalism spawned Grivas' EOKA and, in reaction, its Turkish counterpart, TMT. Two factors further polarized the two communities: the constitutional structures of 1960 and the linkages to the respective motherlands by way of the Treaty of Guarantee. Pollis saw the emergence of two national identities as a gradual process.

She suggested that recent analysis indicates that Greek Cypriots have differentiated themselves from Greeks, Turkish Cypriots from Turks. Young Greek Cypriots increasingly identify themselves as Cypriots, resulting in an interesting process of negative stereotyping vis-à-vis mainland Greeks. At the same time, the presence of Turkish nationals (soldiers, settlers) among the Turkish Cypriots has highlighted the cultural, and even religious, differences between the two groups. These differences are visible in the economic and political life of Turkish Cypriots, including opposition political parties.

Ethnicity, Pollis concluded, is not a fixed category. A dual Cypriot identity differentiated from those of the two motherlands, seems to be gradually emerging, but a merger of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot identities is still not in the offing. She concluded that it was yet possible to create loyalty to the State, and gradually move towards an integration of the two communities.

Due to the emotionalism inherent in ethnic problems, Volkan argued, scientific objectivity could not exist in their analysis. He recalled Horowitz' contention that a bloody phenomenon could not be explained by a bloodless theory. Our image of the enemy is often based on what we put into it, not on who he really is. This, he said, is not necessarily a hindrance. He described ethnicity as a concept in which a person's sense of self is intertwined with that of the group. He suggested that ethnic identity could not be changed after adolescence. Under stress, people would kill to keep it.

Volkan did not share Pollis' view that a common national identity had existed under Ottoman rule. Noting that young and literate individuals constitute large percentages of the two communities, Volkan argued that both Turkish and Greek Cypriots have a separate sense of being islanders. Although similarities in customs exist between the two communities, there is a general denial of a common identity, a denial which prevails and is reinforced through many rituals.

He cited studies that revealed the paradoxes of group rivalry. For instance, a group's desire to maintain a psychological distance from its enemy may ultimately create a greater closeness. This results from the group's preoccupation with its enemy. Volkan emphasized that it was easier to deal with major differences (language, religion) than with smaller ones, which are often built into exaggerated prejudices in periods of stress. Greek and Turkish cultures were both thought to be other-directed, that is, they both felt that an out-group constantly threatened the in-group structure. Volkan argued that each community behaved according to its chosen trauma. Greek Cypriots emphasized the Turkish intervention of 1974, and Turkish Cypriots their perception of the events of 1963 and 1967-1968. These unresolved issues make it very difficult for either side to feel empathy for the other.

Volkan suggested that the solution was not to try to melt the two identities into a common one, but to transform the warlike rituals of difference into more peaceful rituals of group identity and differentiation. Only a mourning period, and an acceptance of changes on both sides would facilitate a solution.

Zenon Stavrinides noted that violent incidents between the two communities were a rather recent phenomenon in the evolution of the Cyprus problem. Politics in Cyprus has meant, especially since British rule, each side opposing the interests and policies of the

other community. This, he argued, stems mainly from a primary identification with a broader nationality -- Greek or Turk.

Stavrinides noted that, throughout the last fifty years, there was often a spectrum of political options among the respective communities. Recent nationalism had, however, greatly polarized the two communities and reduced the range of choices. Stavrinides argued that Cyprus had always had intercommunal problems because Cypriots define themselves according to their position in the Cyprus conflict. The only really peaceful period, he argued, was 1960 to 1963 when Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots talked and did things together.

The development of a political and state structure for the Turkish Cypriots in recent years, now meant that one community could not unilaterally claim the whole or part of the island, to the exclusion of the other community. On the other hand, he also argued that Turkish Cypriots had the right to say that the President of the Republic of Cyprus did not represent them. Stavrinides said that Cyprus is at a crucial juncture in its history.

He did not think that the New York talks were making much progress, and argued that Cypriots should not expect the UN to carry on its good offices indefinitely. The prospect of violence as an alternative to a negotiated settlement was one that should convince everyone of the virtue of negotiations. He differentiated between one-sided demands, which had been for too long a tradition in discussions between Cypriots, and true negotiations.

While understanding why Turkish Cypriots favoured their present security situation, Stavrinides thought it was important for them to understand that Greek Cypriots did not feel secure with the presence of the Turkish army. He stressed that the interest of all Cypriots lay in maintaining and developing the country as a whole and that the present situation undermined the full potential of Cyprus and Cypriots. It appeared obvious, however, that it was in the interest of Cyprus and of Greek Cypriots that the Turkish Cypriot community remain strong. They should enjoy security and welfare within a federal Cyprus in such a way that the interest of the Turkish Cypriot community is linked to the existence of the federation. The two communities should feel the advantages of cooperating together.

Ahmet Gazioğlu opened his presentation by describing the different aspects of the Ottoman millet system. Different religious communities in the empire, including the Greek Cypriots, enjoyed autonomous status. Gazioğlu underlined the right of Greek Cypriots to have their own religion, culture and administration, and stressed the importance of the Greek Orthodox Church as an instrument of nationalism. He argued that the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek Cypriot educational system had led to a Greek Cypriot nationalism that in his view had become an obstacle to the development of a common political identity and reconciliation.

Gazioğlu quoted Greek Cypriot authors to illustrate the Greek Cypriots' sense of superiority and territorial claims. He argued that their activities in support of enosis, part of the megali idea, were pursued in ignorance of and sometimes actively against Turkish Cypriot interests. As a result there was fear among Turkish Cypriots that a new settlement might again collapse and be used as a step towards the final goal of enosis.

Gazioğlu concluded his presentation by enumerating the prerequisites for a common political identity, which he said had never really existed:

a. reform of education systems, including history books;
b. teaching Turkish and Greek languages and culture in the secondary schools of each community;
c. isolation of the Church and clergy from politics, administration, and the legislative process;
d. reversal of enosis position, and support for a bi-zonal federal solution;
e. ending the use of motherland flags;
f. prosecution of underground terrorists;
g. right of self-determination for the two peoples of Cyprus;
h. creation of new institutions to promote mutual understanding; and
i. sincere self-criticism about the events of the last one hundred years.

Discussion ranged widely over a number of issues related to the evolution of a common Cypriot identity. Borovali contended that the Lebanese and Cypriot constitutions were examples of attempts to mediate inter-group conflict. Pollis countered that the

institutional segregation built into those constitutions was not conducive to the creation of unity and harmony required in a united state.

Volkan commented on the habit of a party to a dispute or conflict of projecting its own feelings and perceptions onto the other party, therefore mistakenly thinking it had an understanding of the other party's position.

Rüstem Tatar commented on Greek Cypriot behaviour which had resulted in the denial of the existence of a Cypriot nation, especially after the creation of the Republic in the early 1960s. He said that the prospect of a common state should not mean the denial of two different ethnic groups. He mentioned his own personal experience of the separation of the two communities, even in the so-called mixed villages. He said that nowadays the question of security was dominating all other issues for Turkish Cypriots.

A participant wondered if a common political identity was necessary for reconciliation. Living on the same island, loving the same land, should induce Cypriots to at least cohabit, without fear of violence. Ellen Laipson wondered where Cypriots felt they fitted regionally: in Europe or in the Middle East. Pollis thought that Greek Cypriots felt like Europeans, but with a distinct character.

Çelik denounced the tendency to date the beginnings of the problems of Cyprus to 1974. He explained that, although the two communities lived together for over 400 years before 1974, at separation there were only four or five inter-marriages and not one single Greco-Turkish economic joint venture. All this, he said, meant that the underlying problems had not started recently, and that all Cypriots needed to think about ways to change this tradition of mutual isolation and misperception.

SESSION SUMMARY

The session served to illustrate the wide differences in perceptions that had prevented the emergence of a common political identity. Most participants thought that the current status quo was reinforcing differences and that a common identity could only emerge over time in the context of a mutually satisfactory resolution of the conflict. Many participants thought that there was no strong evidence that the communal elites were prepared to foster the evolution of a common identity or to prepare their respec-

tive communities politically for the readjustments of perceptions and attitudes which would be required in the event of a settlement.

FINAL WORKSHOP CONSIDERATION

During the seminar which concluded the public meeting phase of the project, a final workshop session considered the analysis, concepts and recommendations brought out during the three previous Workshops. The aim was to draw together the progressive experience, insight and personal interactions of participants into a comprehensive review of the theme.

Fisher, the Chairperson of the group considering Cyprus as an example of nation-building in a bicommunal context initiated the discussion by posing four questions:

a. To what extent is a shared Cypriot identity possible or desirable?
b. How could that identity be encouraged or developed?
c. What form of federal system would suit Cyprus?
d. What type of social evolution (including negotiation) might lead to a federal solution?

Pollis thought the first question implied that a unified Cypriot state was a pre-requisite to the building of a Cypriot political identity. Other participants thought some form of common Cypriot identity existed and did not need to be absolutely tied to a federal state solution. Çelik thought that Cypriots were indeed aiming at a united Cypriot State of some federal type, and thus thought that the development of a common Cypriot political identity was desirable. The concepts of nation and identity were discussed, as well as the different forms of state that Cyprus could develop under an agreement. Michael Attalides thought that the development of a common political identity depended a great deal on the state's ability to attract the loyalty of each community. Salem emphasized the contrast between the development of a common political identity and the existence of two different cultural identities. Çelik underlined how centuries of social behaviour had kept the two Cypriot communities apart, and that the road to this common identity would thus be long and difficult, though not impossible. The revision of history textbooks and other educational material was suggested as an example of measures which were of immediate applicability.

Volkan stressed that the role of ethnicity in group processes and identity was quite distinct from each individual's good faith and willingness to resolve the problem. He said there were two independent Cypriot identities, which required step-by-step mourning rituals, together or in parallel, in order to canalize group identity processes. Bernard Wood argued that groups could mourn forever, but that practical work had to be undertaken. Courageous leadership was required to get Cyprus out of its introspective trend, and to help it adjust to a swiftly evolving outside world. The necessity of a reconsideration of past hurts was discussed. The consensus was that the past must be used as lessons for understanding in order to go forward into the future, rather than as excuses not to cooperate and to stand still.

Participants generally agreed that identity, including ethnic identity, was not a fixed category. People belong to various categories depending on the situation, and this identity might change over time; people could have multiple loyalties.

Mustapha Akinci recounted the debate within the Turkish Cypriot community about identity, in which group self-identification oscillates between Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and Turkish. He thought Cypriots should be proud of their respective ethnic identity and should be able to construct some form of common identity based on a sense of belonging to Cyprus. Attalides thought that the combination of a mutually agreed upon federal system and the supra-national structure of the EC would provide the necessary safe-guards concerning human rights, protection of identity, and other related issues. He added that if the EC made the membership of Cyprus contingent upon the resolution of its problems, this possibility of EC membership in itself would help manage and stabilize an agreement. Some participants added that this would certainly be true if Turkey joined the EC as well. The point was also raised that Turkish Cypriots would not endorse EC membership for Cyprus unless Turkey was also a member. Turkish member-ship was regarded as an essential safeguard for Turkish Cypriot interests. Participants suggested that if Cypriots truly thought of themselves as Europeans, then they should note the post-war cooperation within the EC, among former enemies, as a model for communal behaviour.

Philip Stoddard wanted to emphasize the need for concrete actions, in a situation where the present institutionalized stalemate seemed acceptable. Lellos Demetriades insisted that the stalemate was not acceptable, and that changes should be undertaken within the framework provided by the EC. Volkan suggested that money be spent on creating systematic people-to-people relations.

Constantin Stephanou thought that Greek Cypriots had evolved over time towards a sense of identity that was clearly Greek Cypriot, as opposed to mainly Greek. He wondered what had been the evolution on the Turkish side, particularly with respect to the presence of mainland Turkish soldiers and settlers. Turkish Cypriot participants did not agree on the number or influence of mainland settlers (who have their own political party). One went so far as to describe this as a "taboo" issue. However, there was general agreement on differentiating between the recent influx of cheap labour and the Turkish settlers who had married and raised children on the island.

Pepin repeated the argument that a federal constitution is adaptable in all cases, including Cyprus. There were so many options available, he continued, that only a little tolerance for initial imperfection was required.

FINAL WORKSHOP REPORT

Fisher presented a summary of workshop findings and conclusions to the seminar in plenary session. Generally, Fisher said, the workshop participants thought that a shared Cypriot political identity was possible and desirable. Various levels and types of identities were noted: ethnic, cultural, religious, political, national, and so on. The malleability of ethnic identity was an issue debated in the group. There was substantial agreement on the need to move toward a combined identity without contradictions: culturally Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, but politically Cypriot. Participants discussed whether or not political arrangements were necessary for this identity to develop but did not arrive at a conclusion.

The group discussed methods necessary to encourage and develop this Cypriot identity, noting: the importance of acknowledging the past and of learning from it; the need to clarify and discuss issues that arise between groups, as well as within groups (self-analysis); revision of text books and educational systems as a joint endeavour.

There seemed to be substantial agreement that a federal solution is required. The solution should not promote assimilation, but rather show respect for separate cultural identities, give security to each community and attract the loyalty of the two communities. The key is to adapt a federal system to Cyprus, and not the opposite. The need to tolerate imperfections, to be pragmatic, in order to move into the future, was underlined. The emphasis should be on specific projects to help build a shared vision of the future. Informal, yet systematic, discussion of issues, on a people-to-people basis, should be promoted. Participants agreed that the CIIPS Workshops and Seminar had shown the positive results possible with these face-to-face discussions.

THEME II - CYPRUS AS A REGIONAL PROBLEM WITH GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

OVERVIEW

An introductory session in Workshop I and three sessions in Workshop II examined the regional and global significance of the intercommunal conflict in Cyprus. A deeper understanding of the implications of the conflict was gained during these sessions, and this was used as the basis for discussion and recommendations in the final Seminar. Five subject areas were addressed:

1. a social-psychological approach to regional conflict analysis;
2. the great powers and the strategic importance of Cyprus;
3. Cyprus as a factor in regional politics;
4. Cyprus and the impact of elections in Greece and Turkey; and
5. the European Community and the Cyprus conflict.

The sessions were structured to provide a social-psychological approach to the conflict as a complement to the historical and political analyses. Policy experts and area specialists then discussed the impact of the conflict on international, regional and European Community (EC) affairs. Participants assessed the significance of these overlapping and sometimes conflicting implications.

1. A Social-Psychological Analysis

Ron Fisher used an interdisciplinary and eclectic model, based partly on the work of Deutsch, to compare the qualities of competitive and cooperative relationships. As a base to understanding the social-psychological nature of an intercommunal conflict, four questions were posed:

1. How do parties in a conflict perceive and respond to each other, in a way that often leads to escalation?
2. How do the sources of deep-rooted conflict interact with other forces in the escalation of conflict?
3. How do basic human needs affect protracted conflicts?

4. How do the forces of regional and international politics reinforce protracted conflicts?

Fisher addressed these questions, showing the contrast between cooperative and competitive (or conflictual) types of relationships:

1. **perceptions**: in a cooperative relationship, parties have a sensitivity to similarities between them; in a competitive one, they are sensitive to differences;
2. **attitudes**: cooperative partners are usually trusting, friendly and helpful, whereas in a conflictual relationship, parties have suspicious, hostile and exploitative attitudes;
3. **communications**: in a cooperative relationship, communications are open, accurate and relevant; in a competitive relationship, they are usually limited, misleading, perhaps even verging on espionage; and
4. **overall orientations**: in a cooperative relationship, parties see a mutual problem to be solved; in a competitive one, the solution each party has is to be imposed on the other.

Fisher referred to Deutsch's law of social relations: cooperation breeds cooperation, and competition breeds competition. In that sense, when a solution (the 1960 Constitution in Cyprus, for example) is tried out in a competitive relationship, it often becomes unworkable, not always because it is inherently so, but because of the nature of the relationship. Protracted conflicts have concrete sources. These include divergent interests, values and needs -- and, almost always, a long history of antagonism and cultural differences. Those sources fuel threat, reduce trust and feed escalation. What is important is for the parties to understand this multiplicity of sources of conflict.

Fisher stated that protracted conflicts often involve the denial of the human needs for security, identity, participation and freedom. If this denial of human needs is compounded by economic, ethnic and political differences, protracted conflict is bound to arise.

Fisher recommended the encouragement of interdependence and multicultural approaches. Fostering a sense of identity among the members of one group helps them respect the identity of other groups. A danger exists, however, where extreme group identity leads to ethnocentrism, implying the derogation of other groups. The challenge for Cypriots is to establish a balance between a strong individual group identity along with a multi-group national identity.

The Cyprus problem was generally identified as a "regional" conflict. The attitudes of the superpowers, and the proximity of antagonistic regional powers, create a further degree of intractability. According to Fisher, this does not mean that the basic needs of the local communities are not the fundamental sources of the conflict.

Fisher concluded by making a plea for multi-disciplinary analysis in dealing with conflict resolution in Cyprus and other regional conflicts. He stressed the need for the parties to engage in this kind of analysis, including the socio-psychological approach, keeping in mind the political and intercommunal contexts. The parties themselves should engage in this kind of analysis, with or without the presence of "facilitators." Imposed legal solutions will not work if the groups are not allowed to fulfil their basic needs (identity, security, participation, and the like) and if the groups involved do not recognize the need to analyze their relationship in a more cooperative spirit.

2. The Great Powers and Cyprus

Richard Norton in his paper, The Soviet Union and Cyprus, explained how Soviet policy toward the Third World was currently changing quite substantially. Included in these changes was endorsement of the United Nations as an instrument of peacekeeping. The momentum behind these shifts vis-à-vis the Third World was to be found in developments within the Soviet Union. Soviet attitudes to Cyprus were not isolated from these changing policies.

Norton cited evidence that the Third World was now prepared to openly criticize Soviet economic policies, as well as the Soviet use of military force as a foreign policy instrument. Within the Soviet Union there is a realization that it must reduce its international commitments and military spending in order to re-allocate resources and

attempt to solve domestic problems. A less defensive Soviet response to outside criticism revealed evidence of these trends.

Geo-political considerations are now regarded at least as important as Marxist-Leninist ideology in Soviet foreign policy. Norton said that some Soviet academics have judged that there is little of strategic or ideological value worth fighting over in the Third World. Given this new attitude in Soviet Third World policy, Norton did not foresee the Soviets playing an active diplomatic role in resolving the Cyprus conflict. The Soviet Union appears to be satisfied with the status quo, even if the official position still calls for an international conference. Norton suggested that the best way to keep the delicate balance in Soviet (and even US) relations with Greece and Turkey, was not to raise the prominence of the Cyprus issue. The status quo in Cyprus is seen to be preferable to the potential costs of disturbing this equilibrium in relations with Greece and Turkey.

Norton's conclusion was that neither Washington nor Moscow would unnecessarily exert themselves to jeopardize international relationships which are more important than a small and troubled island.

Ellen Laipson in her paper, The US and Cyprus: Past Policies and Current Concerns, postulated that the US had been a major outside player as much by default as by design. She argued that the US had assumed, almost unintentionally, the Western mantle of responsibility for Cyprus.

Laipson traced the considerable variations of US interest in Cyprus over time. US interest increased with independence. In the days of the Cold War, the major concern was to strengthen pro-Western forces on the island. Concern over Cyprus rose sharply in 1964, following the constitutional breakdown in late 1963. US diplomats and leaders played important roles; President Johnson's unusual letter to Turkey, and the now infamous Acheson Plan are examples. This more active period lasted through the mid-1960s. During the 1968-73 period Cyprus was considered a manageable problem for US diplomacy. The 1974 events (coup, Turkish intervention, fall of Greek junta) brought considerable blame on the US. Since 1979, Cyprus has returned to an earlier position of low-to-moderate importance in US foreign policy.

Laipson went on to argue that the strategic importance of Cyprus should not be over-emphasized, and pointed out other factors influencing US policy toward Cyprus. For example, political support by Cyprus for Western policies could have more value to the US than a formal linkage between Cyprus and NATO. Greek and Greek Cypriot Americans have had some influence on the US Congress, pushing for a moral, rather than merely strategic, analysis of Turkish behaviour in Cyprus. Cyprus is also perceived as a reliable small state in various instances of day-to-day international cooperation.

Laipson said that the Cyprus debate in the US was driven by the legislative branch, and thus was an issue in congressional-executive relations. Congress was notably active in refugee relief efforts, the arms embargo against Turkey and the subsequent military aid for Greece and Turkey. Although Congress often expresses its disapproval of Turkey's continued occupation of northern Cyprus, it has recently approached the two sides on Cyprus in a more even-handed fashion. Overall, Cyprus is no longer an acute issue in executive-congressional relations, but it does illustrate what can happen when there is a lack of consensus in the US policy community.

Laipson described the position of the Cyprus issue in the Reagan-Bush transition period. Under Reagan, Cyprus was considered in a narrow regional context, although Richard Haass and his crisis-avoidance policy brought an administration offer to establish a $250-million fund -- still theoretically available -- to be spent on activities contributing to the reunification of the island. It was suggested that the issue of Cyprus had been relegated to a third tier of policy decision making in the State Department.

Laipson foresaw few changes during the Bush Administration. The possibility of serious formal negotiations between Denktaş and Vassiliou, in the present context of the "so-called peace-epidemic" and regional settlement successes, might spark an increased involvement on the part of the US. Present US concerns are: the maintenance of momentum in negotiations; new priorities in the aid programme; the financial viability of UNFICYP in times of high demand for peacekeeping and resource scarcity; and, examining the applicability of US constitutional and federal models, as well as other areas of US expertise. These concerns represented practical and unsentimental approaches to the Cyprus problem.

Answering a question on the apparent lack of British influence in Cyprus despite the presence of the sovereign bases, Laipson suggested that over time the UK had been supplanted by NATO. Norton thought that the importance of the bases had been declining, and that the British role had become irrelevant. Some participants did not agree and, instead, underlined the continuing role of Great Britain as a peacekeeper and its residual responsibilities as a guarantor power.

In response to a question by Melakopides, Laipson acknowledged that there were many allegations of a US conspiracy against the Cypriot government during the 1960s and under Kissinger, but that this interpretation of US policy was over-emphasized by Cypriots, and that incompetence rather than evil intentions could explain some aspects of US policy. A number of participants challenged this "incompetence" interpretation, underlining the links between the US and the Greek junta at the time of the 1974 coup and the appearance of intention. However, Mehmet thought the conspiracy theory blurred the more important issues, and that major factors were left out of the conspiracy position -- the selection of Nicos Sampson to lead the coup, for example.

Paidoussis asked about superpower support for an international conference on Cyprus. Norton answered that, if the sovereign bases were excluded from the negotiations -- as the Greek Cypriots seem to accept -- and given the ongoing talks between the two leaders, there was no real role for an international conference. Given the negative US reaction in 1986, Laipson thought the US remained rather indifferent although publicly favourable in principle to such a conference, if the parties wanted it.

Questioned by Roger Hill on the influence of the Cyprus problem on both US-Greece and US-Turkey relations, Laipson stated that the US was reasonably successful in technically separating the two sets of agendas, although both were psychologically linked.

Changes in Soviet foreign policy -- especially increased support for UN peacekeeping -- would result in major changes in superpower and international relations. In spite of these changes, participants agreed that Cyprus was not a major area of interest for either the US or USSR. The US would remain committed to assisting a settlement, but neither superpower would risk any major initiatives to either undermine the current status quo or to force the pace of negotiations.

3. Cyprus in Regional Politics

Tozun Bahceli, in his paper, Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey since 1955, discussed the Turkish regional interest from four perspectives: Turkey's strategic interest in Cyprus; Cyprus' influence on Turkish domestic politics; Cyprus as a factor in Turkish foreign policy; and, the reactive nature of Turkish policy.

The geographical position of Cyprus, forty miles from the coast of Turkey, has pushed Turkey to oppose the transfer of the sovereignty of the island to Greece. Although Turkish Cypriots are not the only Turkish minority outside Turkey, it has been psychologically important for the Turks to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus, Turkey has a strategic interest in Cyprus and has assumed an interest in the well-being and status of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Bahceli described the important influences of Cyprus on domestic politics in Turkey and the even greater influence Cyprus has exerted on Turkish foreign policy. Partly as a result of its involvement in Cyprus in the 1960s onwards, Turkey was somewhat disillusioned with its NATO allies. As a consequence, it has attempted to improve its relations with its Arab neighbours and with the USSR in order to offset its isolation from the Western world on the Cyprus issue. Finally, Bahceli characterized Turkish policy vis-à-vis Cyprus as reactive.

Turkey had initially overestimated Britain's resolve to retain Cyprus and underestimated the popular support for, and effectiveness of, the EOKA campaign. A reassessment led to support for a policy of partition in 1956. Bahceli argued that the Menderes government capitulated to Turkish public pressure on the Cyprus issue and accepted the compromise of independence for Cyprus, negotiating hard to protect the Turkish Cypriot community.

After 1960, both Greece and Turkey reacted to issues where the initiative rested with the two Cypriot communities. Bahceli characterized Turkish policy from that point on as a reaction to Greek Cypriots' pursuit of enosis. Turkish support of the Turkish Cypriot community increased from 1963-64 with the end of the government partnership. Nevertheless, until 1974 Turkey was resigned to an erosion of its rights and influence on the island. The 1974 coup was the catalyst for Turkish intervention; an act which served

to increase the popularity of the government in Turkey. In that context, the intervention was portrayed as preventing the union of the island with Greece and as preserving the strategic and shared communal interests of Cyprus.

Turkish objectives in any settlement of the Cyprus problem are: greater safeguards for Turkish Cypriot security than existed before 1974; substantial communal sovereignty in a loose bi-zonal federation, rather than complete partition; maintenance of some Turkish military forces on Cyprus; and retention of guarantor rights.

In summary, Bahceli characterized Turkey's general orientation as remaining pro-Western. This orientation is tinged with regret at the West's lack of understanding for Turkish obligations towards their Cypriot brethren. Both Greek and Turkish policy remain reactive, awaiting results from the current series of talks. Turkey would try to remain out of the present debate, in part to improve its relations with Greece and the European Community.

Costas Melakopides started his analysis of The Cyprus Problem in Greek Foreign Policy by distinguishing between two approaches: the realpolitik approach, emphasizing power, order, and military strength; and the idealist approach, relying on diplomacy and legal solutions. Turkey's policy toward Cyprus and Greece was an application of realpolitik while Greece's foreign policy emphasized the idealist model. He described the present situation in Cyprus as inevitable and rational for endorsers of realpolitik but morally unacceptable for idealists.

Melakopides documented the effects of the deep-rooted dependency resulting from the US-Greek patron-client relationship. As a result, a Greek diplomatic success in Cyprus was unlikely, even if Athens and Nicosia had not made mistakes and committed errors of judgement. In support of this thesis, Melakopides cited the Greek sense of betrayal by its NATO allies and their realpolitik attitude towards Britain and Cyprus. For all of these reasons, the Athens-propelled events of July-August 1974 stood outside legitimacy and were not directly attributable to the Greek or Greek Cypriot peoples.

Melakopides' second thesis was that the US and Turkish realpolitik had victimized Greece and Greek Cypriots since 1974. He suggested that the US knew fully of Ankara's preparations for an invasion. Realpolitik was being driven by strategic concerns--

particularly for Turkey's Soviet, Iranian, and Arab frontiers. This explained why the US and Turkey had well-defined intentions and aims in victimizing both Greece -- a fellow NATO member -- and the Greek Cypriots. The result was considerable anti-US, anti-Turkish and anti-NATO sentiments in Greece.

In conclusion, Melakopides noted the contrast between realpolitik security and idealist justice which, combined with the notion of ethics in foreign policy, explained the difficulties of Greek idealist foreign policy since 1974. One option open to Greece was to resort to "quasi-realpolitik" methods, including refusal to negotiate with Ankara, blocking its accession to the EC, and exposing its morally untenable position.

In his paper, Cyprus as Seen by NATO, Roger Hill sought to place the Cyprus issue in a regional context broader than the Greco-Turkish area. Cyprus had a certain bearing on the Middle East question. For example, in the 1950s Cyprus had been seen by Britain as a replacement for the Suez Canal Zone and had been used as a staging area for the Suez invasion. Britain had kept sovereign base areas in Cyprus after the island became independent. However, conflict in the Middle East does not have a truly causal impact on Cyprus, and Cyprus is not a crucial factor in Middle East conflicts.

Cyprus plays a much greater role in the politics of NATO's Southern flank. It also has some impact on the politics of the Western Alliance as a whole, without Cyprus actually being a part of NATO. Hill characterized the alliance's attitude towards Cyprus as one of desiring the issue to be resolved, partly to alleviate the suffering on the island, and partly because this dispute is seen as a wedge driving apart two key allies. Hill outlined the positive, but generally unremarked role of assistance that NATO has played during repeated crises concerning Cyprus. NATO held intensive consultations on the matter during the crises of 1960, 1964, and 1974, as well as at other times. NATO consultative systems were considered to have helped to contain the danger of war between Greece and Turkey during the crisis of 1974. NATO would like the military resources of both countries to be more focused on the potential threat from the north, rather than on each other.

Hill noted that, during his time at NATO -- between 1968 and 1973 -- Turkey and Greece had taken similar positions on virtually every issue except Cyprus. Cyprus, and now the Aegean dispute, bitterly divided those two countries and left the other allies

trying to contain the consequences or to mediate as much as possible. Sometimes NATO simply avoided the issue. NATO has looked to the UN force in Cyprus to keep peace on the island and to the United Nations to prevent war between Greece and Turkey. One of the best contributions that Canada makes to the Alliance is to participate effectively in UNFICYP.

Hill contrasted the multilateral and integrated NATO organization in Western Europe with the collection of bilateral arrangements within NATO on the Southern flank. The most important of these bilateral relationships are between the United States and each of the countries of the region. From a NATO point of view, one has to ask what are the effects of the Cyprus dispute on US-Greek and US-Turkish relations. Generally speaking the influence is negative. So, efforts are made to insulate the two bilateral relationships and to contain the effects of the problem.

The Western allies thus have every reason to favour peace in Cyprus, the containment of the problem, and the search for a peaceful settlement. Relations among NATO allies on the South Eastern flank have suffered severely at times because of the Cyprus problem and will never really be satisfactory until a solution is found. However, none of this should be taken to mean that the allies feel that Cyprus itself is responsible for past difficulties. Cyprus is generally perceived as a tragedy with deep historical roots.

John Sigler opened the discussion with a comment about the paradox of looking to the future yet constantly returning to the past. He emphasized the necessity to look at ways to resolve problems, independent from the historical background. Several participants agreed that the historical record was open to varying interpretations and, indeed, subject to manipulation. Others felt that current perceptions -- both communal and regional -- were so highly influenced by historical interpretation that it was a factor which could never be entirely separated from discussions.

Challenged on the validity of his approach, Melakopides countered that his analysis appeared nationalistic from a Canadian point of view only because Canada had not been threatened as had Greece and Cyprus. Kitsikis commented on the absence of legal grounds for Melakopides' description of the Greek junta policies as illegitimate and void.

In further discussion of NATO's roles and interests, Hill reiterated the alliance's determination not to interfere with the ongoing UN process, as well as the difficulty of merging NATO's general East-West and more local objectives and interests. Paidoussis wondered if Turkish Cypriots saw an alternative to the presence of the Turkish army--a source of Greek Cypriot insecurity -- perhaps involving a collaboration on the part of NATO. Bahceli answered that Greek Cypriots would not accept NATO forces on the island. If Turkish Cypriots wanted to keep Turkey as a guarantor, they would have to be amenable to a multilateral option. Hill thought NATO would support this kind of solution if it satisfied both parties and was considered superior to alternative approaches. Milner reminded participants that the bulk of the forces in UNFICYP were from NATO nations as had been the bulk of voluntary financial contributions for UNFICYP funding.

Soysal challenged the perception that Cyprus and the Aegean were isolated areas of opposition between Greece and Turkey. Greece's realpolitik policies opposed Turkey on almost all international issues, including on the EC. He did not agree with Melakopides' characterization of their respective policies -- ie, Greece's as idealist and Turkey's as realpolitik. Soysal agreed with Coufoudakis that, although Cyprus had been a catalyst in Turkish policy, other factors and concerns explained shifts in Turkish policies during the 1960s. Bahceli gave considerably more weight to some of the consequences of the US arms embargo on Turkey.

4. Cyprus and the Impact of Elections in Greece And Turkey

In contrast with the opinions of a number of other participants, Soysal was not at all sure that there would be early elections in Turkey. These are not due until 1992, since Özal won the 1987 elections with a majority of seats in parliament. Soysal commented on the similarities between the Greek and Turkish electoral systems, and on the possibility of a party winning a majority of seats while having only a minority of votes. He described some specific features of the Turkish constitution and tradition that may influence or explain the holding of early elections.

Several questions quickly arose. If there were early general elections in Turkey, and if Özal was replaced, what would be the consequences? How much difference exists among Turkish political leaders regarding the Cyprus problem? Soysal blamed the decline in enthusiasm on the lack of progress in both the Cyprus and Aegean issues. The EC

membership application is a "success" on which Özal cannot rely because of continued uncertainty. The linkage among the Davos spirit,* the possibility of EC membership, and the Cyprus issue is not much of an asset in solving the problem. The urgency of resolving the Cyprus problem has decreased in Turkey. Europeans have come to be perceived as focusing on the island conflict only to avoid discussing Turkey's integration within Europe. Turkey refuses to link the issues of integration and a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Soysal discussed the issue of other Turkish communities abroad: in Western Thrace, Azerbaijan, and Bulgaria. Human rights abuses against these minorities have largely been ignored by the international community, including Canada. This has resulted in a perception of isolation and a conviction that ethnic Turks can rely only on Turkey for help. These perceptions have had a negative effect on the Turkish approach to the Cypriot problem.

Byron Theodoropoulos, in his paper, Elections in Greece and Turkey and Their Implications for Cyprus, argued that elections and shifts in power in Greece and Turkey have had only a very low degree of relevance in the development of the Cyprus question, albeit for different reasons.

Elections on the Turkish mainland, for example, have had minimal impact on policy toward Cyprus. Since the 1950s, despite changes in leadership, there has been no significant variation of Turkish policy. Ankara's policies have always been adhered to by Turkish Cypriots. Theodoropoulos attributed the Turkish Cypriot dependence on Turkey to several factors: the small size and economic weakness of the Turkish Cypriot community; the presence of Turkish forces and Turkish settlers; the continuing requirement for massive economic aid from Turkey; and the perceived security interests of Turkey.

---

* In January 1988, the leaders of Turkey and Greece met in Davos, Switzerland. The term, "Davos Spirit," refers to the sense of optimism that was created by the promising meeting.

In contrast, "the impact of the Cyprus question on Greek politics has been far greater than the implications of Greek party politics on the Cyprus question." Athens proved its inability to guide or control developments in Cyprus when it failed to keep Makarios from following his own agenda. The only point at which Athens was able to impose its perspective on Makarios was the time of the catastrophic coup of 1974. This was the culmination of twenty-five years of debate over who had responsibility in Cyprus, the Greeks or the Greek Cypriots. After 1974, this friction almost disappeared; Nicosia has responsibility and is supported by Athens which consults on a systematic basis with the Greek Cypriot leadership.

In part, the differences in relations between each pair of actors can be explained by the relatively high level of economic and social assets which make Greek Cypriots less dependent on, and more influential in, Greece. Each mother country also has its own agenda. Theodoropoulos argued that Greece's aim was to end foreign domination over Greek Cypriots, while Turkey puts more emphasis on its own security interests. Theodoropoulos concluded that the true protagonists in the conflict -- Greek Cypriots in Nicosia and mainland Turks in Ankara -- have never talked to each other.

In general discussion, Stavrinides thought that Denktaş' ability to influence the Turkish electorate had often been underestimated. Soysal did not agree. His interpretation was that Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks simply shared the same ethnic pride. Çelik contested Theodoropoulos' interpretation of the imposition of Turkish policy in northern Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots, he said, are as independent from Ankara's policies as Greek Cypriots are from Athens'. Mehmet underlined the absence of reference to enosis in Theodoropoulos' intervention.

Attalides felt that it was not apparent in Soysal's position that Turkey had an interest in solving the Cyprus problem. He enumerated several reasons why he thought that it was indeed in Turkey's interest to have a solution in Cyprus. Theodoropoulos was reminded by Dobell that, although instances of mainland Greek influence on Greek Cypriots were rare, on each occasion the effects were felt for a very long time.

Akinci did not agree with Soysal that every Turkish leader had the same attitude towards Cyprus. He contrasted Özal's father-son type of relationship with Ecevit's less paternalistic attitude. He also described Theodoropoulos' conclusion about the need for a

Greek Cypriot-Turkish dialogue as an underestimation of political dynamism in northern Cyprus.

Soysal made a plea for a solution based on political equality, claiming that Turkey, despite allegations, also wanted an independent federal solution in Cyprus. But some fundamental principles -- bi-zonality, political equality, and an effective guarantee by Turkey -- will not be sacrificed for the sake of a solution. Turkish troops were not on the island for strategic considerations but rather to fulfil the security needs of the Turkish Cypriot community.

5. The European Community and the Cyprus Conflict

Semih Vaner's paper, Chypre, la Grèce, la Turquie et la Communauté européenne, dealt mostly with the political issues of the Cyprus-EC relationship. The EC's position toward Greece and Turkey was described as maintenance of equilibrium, even after Greece became an official member. The EC did not want the type and timing of the membership of the two countries to symbolize a Community shift of position on any point of contention between Greece and Turkey, including the issues of Cyprus and the Aegean.

The Cyprus conflict has, nevertheless, become one of the main obstacles to the improvement of Turkey-EC relations. Greece saw Cyprus as an EC issue; Turkey regarded it as bilateral. Vaner noted an apparent unfavourable trend against Turkey in the EC's positions on Cyprus. Greece had deliberately used its member status in the EC to slow down an improvement of Turkey-EC relations, Cyprus being only one of the issues on which Greece pushed for common EC positions against Turkey. This, as well as the internal Turkish political and economic climate, human rights concerns, and diminished interest in the Turkish geopolitical zone for the EC, has slowed down the expected improvements in EC/Turkey relations. Other EC members prefer a strategic and economic rapprochement with Turkey outside of full membership. Without established benchmarks for full membership, Turkey is reticent. Therefore, Vaner did not view full Turkish membership in the EC as a short-term possibility.

On the other hand, the Republic of Cyprus has established harmonious relations with the EC. Cyprus is now the only country to have a customs union with the Community and has become an important off-shore business centre for European corporations.

Although there is resistance on the island -- from AKEL, for instance -- to complete integration with the EC, the customs union status seems to satisfy Cypriot economic concerns. Increased economic integration and the free movement of labour in the Community are often cited as being incompatible with the communal guarantees and divisions of power required for a bi-zonal structure in Cyprus. Without the full membership of Turkey, Turkish Cypriots remain apprehensive concerning an island wide application of the Republic of Cyprus-EC customs union agreement.

Vaner considered three possible scenarios regarding the evolution of EC membership in the region:

- only the Republic of Cyprus joins the EC -- this would mean only the south of the island joining, further formalizing partition, and further isolating Turkey which could in turn seek alliances outside of Europe;
- both the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey join the EC -- the unrecognized northern Republic would remain outside the community while Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus would enjoy membership; and
- only Turkey joins the EC -- this would mean a deeper rapprochement between Greece and Turkey than the Davos spirit, and the future membership of Cyprus.

Vaner thought the third scenario the most desirable but did not see Turkish membership in the EC as likely before the end of the century. He nevertheless underlined the influence and interest of the EC in the region and thought that the Community was the best-placed actor -- compared with the US and USSR -- to mediate for improvements in both Greece-Turkey and Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot relations. The past trend to apply pressure only on Turkey had not yielded the kind of result that would justify its continuation.

Much of the discussion period focussed on the advantages and disadvantages of Turkish membership in the EC and on regional changes that this might bring. Kitsikis identified a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey as being more important than Turkey joining the EC. Both he and Vaner agreed that Turkish entry into the EC would not necessarily improve Greco-Turkish relations any more than NATO membership had. Hill wondered why the EC had been passive on the Cyprus issue in the past and how it

might, better than either the UN or NATO, act as a potential mediator. McDonald stated that the EC had a similar passive, status quo attitude in dealing with other European areas of disagreement like Ireland and Gibraltar.

In response to a question on the "Europeanness" of both Greece and Turkey, Vaner responded that both countries had chosen this orientation for some time and that nothing seemed to indicate a different trend in the near future. Soysal suggested that Greece, Turkey and Cyprus shared an inferiority complex vis-à-vis Europe. The race for apparent European prestige was not assisting better Greco-Turkish relations.

There was also considerable discussion on the utility of regional intervention in negotiations. Paidoussis wondered if direct relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkey would not be the best avenue in a search for a settlement. Vaner and other participants thought negotiations should remain between Cypriots at the intercommunal level. Christofides argued that Turkey was reluctant to accept an international forum for mediation because of its military advantage in the situation. Soysal countered that the non-recognition of a functioning state in northern Cyprus was the main stumbling block in the conflict resolution process. Answering Soysal's comment, Zafiriou suggested that the main obstacle to a negotiated settlement was not legitimacy but the presence of the Turkish army on the island. For many, this presence remained a symbol of Turkey's will to perpetuate the partition of the island and further illustrated why Cypriots themselves had to resolve the conflict.

SESSION SUMMARY

In reviewing the session, participants agreed that the social-psychological analysis did offer a perspective that enhanced understanding of the conflict. The papers on Greek and Turkish policies on Cyprus as a regional issue served to illustrate the widely differing perceptions and attitudes which can exist when dealing with the same situation. However, there were positive signs that current opportunities for enhanced communications between leaders were being exploited.

There was also a general consensus, based on the evidence of past behaviour, that the superpowers -- as well as NATO and the EC -- had directed interest in Cyprus largely towards management of the problem rather than its resolution. Cyprus was not

regarded as a major issue but rather as a situation under control. The practical concerns of the US and USSR -- and to a lesser extent NATO and the EC -- was, therefore, to see that it remained low profile and did not become an impediment to more important bilateral or alliance concerns. This did not mean that the international community did not have an interest in conflict resolution in Cyprus. It did mean, however, that major initiatives for resolution would have to come from the Cypriots themselves. Aid and other forms of transitional assistance would then be forthcoming.

FINAL WORKSHOP CONSIDERATION

During the Seminar which concluded the public meeting phase of the project, a final workshop session considered the analysis, concepts, and recommendations brought out in the three previous workshops. The aim was to draw together the progressive experience, insight, and personal interactions of the participants into a comprehensive review of the theme and to project various scenarios into the future.

The Chairperson of the session, Ellen Laipson, began by introducing some points made in the previous workshops. She addressed some of the arguments put forward during the previous workshops. Alex Morrison had argued that the resolution of the Cyprus question would help stabilize the region, but that the absence of resolution would not contribute to regional deterioration. Where, Laipson asked, does Cyprus fit in the current "peace epidemic" and general change in East-West relations? When was the Cyprus issue a global problem in the past?

Sherry thought that the thaw in East-West relations did not necessarily help the Cyprus problem. This idea was supported by a number of other participants. He argued that less tense relations may mean that the superpowers simply won't bother about Cyprus, since the island would become a peripheral area of rivalry and competition.

Soysal thought that a lack of superpower concern might leave Cypriots to negotiate a solution themselves with less manipulation, and better chances of success, than in the past. Borovali thought that, although the Cyprus case was not critical at the global level, it was still unresolved at the regional level. The overall effect on Cyprus of easier East-West relations was thus indeterminate; Cyprus was not generally considered to be a problem with global implications.

Participants noted that Greek Cypriots wanted international pressure and visibility, while Turkish Cypriots seemed not to welcome what they perceived as the internationalization of the conflict. The potential role of the USSR was discussed, including the idea of an international conference. Participants debated the points of view of the US, the UN, and the two Cypriot communities on the matter.

It was mentioned that, although Greece and Turkey are not looking at Cyprus from the same perspective, there is a lessening in the degree to which they see Cyprus as an international problem. There was a consensus that Turkey had a strategic interest in Cyprus.

The issue of the British bases, as well as the involvement of NATO and the UN in the debate, was also discussed. Participants did not think that there would be a problem in removing the bases, since the bases do not relate to Cyprus as such, unless NATO--more specifically the US -- disagreed because of other regional concerns. The ongoing UNFICYP operations were still considered a useful international presence on the island.

Vaner linked the Cyprus conflict to other current ethnic conflicts in the region. He thought that there was some sort of concerted Occidental indifference towards these conflicts, in part because of the "rise of Islam." Laipson thought that there was also a fatigue factor present in the attitude of external actors towards Cyprus.

Dobell discussed the linkages between the Cyprus conflict and other conflicts in the Middle-Eastern Mediterranean area. There seemed to be agreement that resolution of the Cyprus conflict would help the region, especially Greco-Turkish relations.

Looking to the future, participants asked: What would be the international and regional setting in the 1990s? How would it influence the situation in Cyprus? It was mentioned that Cyprus lay more in the European zone -- where arms control is the trend -- than within the Middle East -- where the trend is towards arms build-up. Ironically, Cyprus could in fact benefit economically from an emphasis on arms purchases and trade in the Middle-East.

If Cyprus were reunited within a federal structure, some participants suggested that it would probably enter the EC as a member before Turkey. It was implied that a united Cyprus entering the EC would perhaps ease some tensions which make it difficult for Turkey to enter. However, this assessment had been contested earlier by Vaner. Dobell thought that, if Turkey became an EC member, the European Community -- especially given its economic dimension -- would be more able than the UN or NATO to help resolve the Cyprus problem.

Laipson listed changes to the world system in the 1990s assuming continued improvement in East-West relations: the unification of Europe; the shift of Western decision-making slightly outside of the NATO context towards the EC which could mean some decline of the Turkish role in the Western system; and the stronger role for the UN, making it a more efficient organization in conflict resolution. She suggested that, if there were successes in arms control talks, Europe could extend its problem-solving capability. Referring to a comment by Soysal, she also said that the EC structure was diluting the pre-eminence of the nation-state identity -- sometimes to the benefit of sub-national identities.

Laipson suggested an examination of two possibilities in the management of the situation in Cyprus. The first is that of a federal agreement and EC membership. The second is of an unresolved conflict which does not contribute to further deterioration in the region, unless something dramatic happens in Cyprus itself. It was argued that Cyprus would conform to the trend toward arms reduction or control in the northern Mediterranean rather than toward the proliferation on the southern shore.

Hill thought that prospects for resolving the Cyprus question had improved and that the Cyprus question was losing its capacity to contribute to regional deterioration because of the improving international environment.

FINAL WORKSHOP REPORT

Laipson presented a summary of the workshop findings and conclusions to the seminar in plenary session. She reported agreement that, historically, the Cyprus issue had possessed greater salience than it does presently. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was an acute problem in East-West relations and a serious concern for NATO. Cyprus is less

and less a problem of world consequence, partly because it is of diminishing concern to Greece and Turkey. The presence of the British bases, UNFICYP, and the increasing role of the Secretary-General are signs of a continued commitment toward Cyprus on the part of the world community. The new trend of better East-West relations, including the management of regional conflicts, elicited two analyses. Some thought that the disengagement of the superpowers could bring the positive result of letting the parties settle without external pressure. Others noted that the disengagement of the superpowers could have a negative impact because problems like Cyprus could be neglected and allowed to continue.

Europe was seen as an increasingly important player, changing the balance among Western actors towards the EC and away from NATO. The European system was assumed to be increasingly suited to regional and local levels of identity, as opposed to national identities, thus fitting more with the Cypriot situation. The weakening of NATO's influence was discussed and brought up two possibilities: Turkey could lose some of its relative strategic importance in the region; or, even if it did not influence the EC very much, Turkey could still increase its influence on the immediate region.

Participants suggested that there would be an increasingly important role for the UN, as well as a greater dependence on multilateral solutions and approaches to conflicts. If the Cyprus problem was solved along the lines of a mutually agreed federal solution, Cyprus could be a stimulus to Greco-Turkish reconciliation. Then Cyprus and Turkey could join the EC. If the problem is not solved, the international system would continue to tolerate the situation and outside players would be less likely to get involved in Cyprus. Cyprus belongs neither to the category of "Third World conflicts" -- such as Afghanistan and Angola -- being resolved without internal reconciliation, nor to the category of ethnic conflicts now arising in Yugoslavia and some Soviet republics.

THEME III - PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

OVERVIEW

A total of seven sessions in Workshops I and III were devoted to discussion of peacekeeping and peacemaking. Themes developed in these workshop sessions were brought together in the Seminar Workshop. The sessions dealt with five main areas of concern. These were:

1. the Canadian interest in Cyprus;
2. the record of United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts;
3. the theory and application of conflict management and conflict resolution techniques;
4. Cypriot perspectives of the conflict and the prospects of successful resolution; and
5. the future role of the United Nations in Cyprus.

The wide-ranging areas of concern under the theme of peacekeeping and peacemaking was reflected in a similar diversity of presenters, discussants, and participants. These ranged from United Nations staff, military peacekeepers, theorists and practitioners of conflict resolution, as well as influential members of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Canada, who acted in a private capacity. The resulting mix of theory, scholarship, practical experience and personal knowledge of issues acted as an effective catalyst in the Workshops.

1. Canadian Interest in Cyprus

In his paper, The Canadian Interest in Cyprus, Clayton Beattie suggested that Canadian interest stemmed almost exclusively from the Canadian Forces' twenty-five year participation in UNFICYP. This general peacekeeping interest was balanced by an appreciation of the regional dimension of the conflict -- Greco-Turkish relations and NATO's Southern Flank issues, for example. However, the regional, NATO, and even Commonwealth factors were more a policy and academic concern than an area of general public discussion.

Citing the role of UNFICYP in 1974, Beattie emphasized the practical experience gained by the Canadian military in peacekeeping skills such as ceasefire negotiations, refugee movement, and humanitarian operations. The costs of maintaining the Canadian contingent on Cyprus must be balanced by the benefits of military command and leadership skills gained during United Nations duty. It was the effectiveness of these military skills that enabled contingents to adapt to peacekeeping roles. The UN's reputation permitted it to undertake operations to minimize casualties, property damage, and human suffering during the military actions of 1974. Effective military training and adaptability also enabled UNFICYP to maintain an impartial position in the supervision of the ceasefire and the establishment of the Buffer Zone interposed between the combatant forces.

Nevertheless, the continued effectiveness of UNFICYP as a mechanism to prevent fighting, and the military training benefits of peacekeeping experience, do not prevent Canadians from raising the question: "When will it end?" The apparent lack of progress towards a settlement in Cyprus and the increasing demands for peacekeeping forces in Namibia, Cambodia, and Central America are factors which could force a reassessment of Canada's UNFICYP commitment. Pressure to reduce the Canadian contingent -- currently Canada's largest at 575 persons -- could increase if other peacekeeping operations were perceived to be more critical to international order.

In discussion, Sigler identified a Canadian vocation in peacekeeping which was perceived by the Canadian public as a positive international role. This perception did not extend, however, to direct interest in Cyprus per se. Wellsman referred to the lack of detailed political briefings for personnel selected for senior UNFICYP appointments. McDonald noted that Canada, in spite of direct involvement with Cyprus issues both on the island and at UN Headquarters, did not maintain a permanent diplomatic representative in Cyprus. Other participants commented on the lack of trade and cultural connections. However, the support and encouragement given the CIIPS project by Canadians with heritage links to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus was noted.

The consensus appeared to be that Canadian interest in Cyprus was indirect and reflected a general support for United Nations' peacekeeping operations as a means of controlling conflict situations. This indirect interest was strengthened by the direct

interest resulting from the personal experience of peacekeeping soldiers as well as the presence of Canadians of Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot heritage. Regional conflicts, alliance concerns and the detailed knowledge of communal issues were largely in the domain of the specialist. Despite this, increased public knowledge and discussion of these issues was judged to be advantageous.

2. The Record of the United Nations

The United Nations' experience in Cyprus has shown that peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts do not automatically lead to the solution of a conflict. The chronology of the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts in Cyprus through UNFICYP and the peacemaking initiatives of the Secretary-General have been well documented in both primary and secondary sources. The protracted nature of these processes, and the apparent lack of progress towards a solution, have raised concerns about the utility of the United Nations as an instrument of world peace and security.

Informed discussion of this issue should be based on a reasonable understanding of what peacekeeping and peacemaking can accomplish. Therefore, the project opted for a general overview and theoretical approach on the processes of peacekeeping and peacemaking rather than a detailed analysis of specific initiatives.

In his presentation, The United Nations Viewpoint on Cyprus, James Holger developed the linkage required between peacekeeping and peacemaking. While peacekeeping can lead to a suspension of hostilities and restore calm and order, peacemaking efforts are still required as an essential supplement if a solution is to be reached. Peacekeeping is, therefore, only a means to the end of peacemaking.

A wide gap of mistrust and suspicion separates the two communities. The efforts of peacemaking were focused on lessening that mistrust and suspicion. Confidence-building measures have an important role to play. Examples cited by Holger were joint economic ventures, revision of history textbooks, and the removal of trade barriers. Mention was made of the United Nations role in the development of the Nicosia Master Plan. This plan, which has the support of the municipal leaders of both communities, will facilitate the cooperative development of municipal services and facilities. As such, most observers

see it as a practical and common sense measure which does not prejudice any eventual solution but ameliorates the human condition of the city's inhabitants.

Holger saw a role for influential countries, like Canada, to assist the Secretary-General's efforts in peacemaking. The limited budget of the United Nations and the widespread demands on its administrative resources leave considerable scope for co-ordinated international efforts to assist the peacemaking process.

Georges Sherry, in his paper, What Went Wrong?, cautioned participants to have realistic expectations of what could be achieved. He questioned the image of conflicting parties negotiating with eagerness to reach a settlement. Parties wanted to win, not to settle. Therefore, negotiations did not usually resolve the disputes. Instead, negotiations were necessary to formalize an agreement when the parties had already decided that the conflict was too costly to continue. The major role for the UN is in the control and management of impasses when, as in the case of Cyprus, the opposing parties seemed to fear and avoid compromises in part to preserve their vested interests. Sherry identified two approaches which had been used in the past by the Secretary-General or his Special Representative to overcome these communal factors. These approaches were the "mini-package" and the "comprehensive."

In the "minipackage" approach, success in a limited negotiating area is used as an inducement in getting the parties to further agree on other areas of settlement. Although the "minipackage" approach possessed short-term advantages, both parties had exhibited reservations to this approach in the past because of the fears of reaching by increments an irreversible, unsatisfactory settlement.

The other approach utilized by the Secretary-General has attempted to resolve all outstanding issues in one "comprehensive" negotiated agreement. In contrast to "mini-packages", which could be negotiated by committees delegated for that purpose, a "comprehensive" agreement required high-level negotiations. The political risks of this approach were also proportionately higher. Sherry's assessment was that the "mini-package" or confidence-building approach was the most promising at a time when there was no real threat of a resurgence of violence on the island.

In the discussion period, participants agreed that neither the trend towards better relations between the superpowers nor the presence of a politically independent President Vassiliou had exerted any major influence on the conflict resolution process in Cyprus. Both Holger and Sherry agreed that these developments, along with the recent improvement of Greco-Turkish relations, contributed to a better atmosphere for ongoing talks. Recognition was also accorded to the role of the European Community (EC) in support of UN initiatives. The potential entry of Turkey into the EC was cited as having a possibly positive influence on the resolution process.

Several participants presented arguments showing the negative effects of external linkages. Afxentiou, while admitting mistakes on the part of Greek Cypriots and the Colonels' regime in Greece, saw the attitudes of both the United Kingdom and the United States as insensitive to the interests of Cypriots. The situation in Cyprus could be traced to a long-term annexation policy on the part of Turkey, taking advantage of Greek mistakes, incited by the British policy of divide and rule and encouraged tacitly by US policies. In such circumstances, United Nations efforts were bound to fail.

Borovali conceptualized concentric circles of causation beginning with the Cypriot communities themselves, extending to Greece and Turkey, widening further to regional organizations like NATO and the EC, and finally to the Great Powers -- the US and USSR. Bacheli commented that internal factors were often underrated in analyses of the Cyprus conflict.

The points raised by Afxentiou, Borovali, and Bahceli prompted an extended discussion of external versus internal factors as they affected the efforts of the United Nations. No consensus was reached although there was some agreement that regarding a settlement the primary objective of the Greek Cypriots was to avoid territorial partition whereas the Turkish Cypriots focused on ensuring the protection of their security interests. It was agreed that the issue of the three freedoms -- settlement, movement and ownership -- remained more a question of principle than practice. This issue could only be resolved as part of a comprehensive settlement and then perhaps only after an extended period of peacemaking and confidence-building measures through minipackages.

Wellsman opened a discussion of how the practical realities of confidence-building measures were often overtaken by political concerns. An example is the Nicosia Airport which many had assessed as being beyond economic repair. Nevertheless, like the closed Varosha tourist area, it remained an active item for discussion. By focusing on options that had acquired increased political but lessened practical importance, effective new approaches were not developed. In response, Holger said that, unfortunately, political factors in negotiations tended to dominate the practical, although efforts were continually being made to link progress on political symbols with practical measures.

Further discussion identified the detrimental role of stereotyping as a disincentive to constructive negotiations. Returning to the question of textbooks raised by Holger, Salem examined the influence of these stereotypes on negotiations. The traditional national attributes -- commerce for Greeks -- and diplomacy/military careers for Turks -- suggested that further analysis was needed for a social-psychological understanding of the conflict. Holger observed that, at present, the UN did not envisage such a social-psychological approach and that a legalistic approach would probably continue to dominate negotiations. Nevertheless, the approach had considerable potential in situations of ethnic rivalry especially, as elaborated by Fisher, in pre-negotiation phases.

In his paper, Cyprus and Peace in the Region, Alex Morrison used fictitious personal profiles to illustrate attitudes of communities on Cyprus. All have adapted to the current situation in their own way, but they still harbour a desire for the past, or, rather, their perception of the past. Expanding on a theme introduced earlier by Holger, Morrison observed that a changing international situation and leadership could open new opportunities for negotiation. In particular, he noted that the Turkish Cypriot leadership had remained relatively fixed for a number of decades. Several participants questioned the pertinence of describing Denktaş as an obstacle to negotiations. Çelik considered the notion naive while Vamik Volkan said that former United Nations officials, because of their dedication, often exhibited a degree of emotionalism and frustration when faced with the apparent lack of progress in Cyprus negotiations. Stavrinides pointed out that the greatest threat posed by leaders was their failure to prepare their respective communities for the political consequences of a settlement.

The papers and discussions confirmed among the participants the difficulties of maintaining progress towards a settlement through the mechanisms of peacekeeping and peacemaking. The success of the peacekeeping operation on Cyprus had established the necessary pre-conditions for the negotiation process. The techniques available, whether comprehensive or confidence-building in approach, have not been able to overcome the dominant political concerns in the two communities. In a broader context, it was also recognized that the United Nations could not achieve any measure of success without the consistent support of the international community. While the degree of external influence might be debated, such influences could not be ignored as a factor in negotiations. In spite of a certain degree of negativism, it was agreed that continued negotiations and good-office missions offered the best promise for the identification of new options or formulas for confidence-building measures.

3. Conflict Management - Theory and Application

By way of opening new perspectives on the role of third party participants, Brian Mandell presented a paper on Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution: Theory and Application. Beginning by asking whether Cyprus was unique compared to other regional problems, he characterized the Cyprus situation as one of protracted social conflict (PSC). Edward Azar's definition of PSCs is "hostile interactions extending over long periods with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare which fluctuate in frequency and intensity." This seemed to fit the circumstances of Cyprus.

Mandell differentiated between conflict management -- short-term settlements achieved through power bargaining and concession making -- and conflict resolution -- a solution coming from the parties themselves including a sense of reconciliation. The requirements for successful conflict management are not necessarily the same as those for resolution. Cyprus has been managed successfully but not resolved. With a stable status quo, the chances of resolution were diminished. A new crisis was required to trigger the resolution process.

A successful third party for the conflict resolution process must not only be able to understand the intercommunal aspects of the problem but must also overcome resistance to the resolution process. The UK, US, and USSR had each attempted a third-party role and failed, as had the UN in spite of the "Davos spirit." Mediation without muscle was

the cause of failure of these third-party efforts. What was called for was a rethinking of third-party roles.

Mandell envisaged two forms of third-party intervention. One form would apply in situations where the parties were already committed to a formal negotiation process. The second approach would assist parties in creating the conditions for negotiations. The problem in Cyprus was how to reconcile the basic needs of the two communities for security and identity. These were prerequisites for the formal negotiation process, which would involve specific interests such as the constitution, territory, and demilitarization. A broader concept of third-party assistance was required in order to handle the two processes of reconciling needs and negotiating interests.

Kelman agreed with these two approaches to third-party participation: generating reassurance and generating agreement through negotiations. In Cyprus security concerns lie at the heart of the conflict. Security is conceived of in both physical and cultural terms. The failure of negotiations and the perpetuation of conflict in Cyprus reflects the fact that conflict is an affirmation of a separate identity, while negotiation is a threat to group existence.

Therefore, a bilateral forum is required to begin the process of reassurance. Third-party assistance cannot be based on binding agreements. Kelman thought that the UN would have difficulty operating in this relatively unstructured, and unofficial process. Nevertheless, this process must proceed if there is to be a binding agreement in the second phase. Without the linkage of the two approaches the best that can be achieved is management of a conflict or an imposed solution.

Kelman recommended that confidence-building measures form part of the reassurance process. They should promote interdependence through functional rather than constitutional arrangements. However, a step-by-step negotiating approach was less likely to succeed, particularly if it ignored basic security needs.

Loizos felt that Mandell's model, while useful for exploring third-party assistance, did not go far enough in providing direction for intellectual and political action. While recognizing the utility of UNFICYP in moderating conflict on Cyprus, Loizos questioned its role in conflict resolution. Without a revised concept of third-party assistance, he

argued that, if current talks fail, it would be reasonable for the Secretary-General to announce a moratorium on further attempts at negotiation.

Loizos opposed the suggestion that the absence of a pressing crisis was the reason for the perpetuation of the Cyprus conflict. The memories of crises were too fresh in the minds of the Cypriot people and their leaders. These social and psychological scars persist under the veneer of economic success. Trusting people who have hurt you is difficult, and Cypriots, like the Spaniards after their civil war, might have to await a new generation for wounds to begin to heal.

Volkan continued this line of discussion by suggesting that there was a competition of historical hurts. A mourning period was required to come to terms with past hurts. A third party must understand this behaviour and accept that people and leaders must go through this sometimes lengthy period of sorrow.

Fisher agreed with Volkan that there was a danger in using the concept of social pathology which was associated with protracted social conflicts. Each conflict is unique. It is inappropriate to describe a situation involving human processes as pathological. Loizos and Bahceli suggested that the relatively small number of casualties in Cyprus compared to other Mid-East conflicts was encouraging. James Jonah said that Cyprus, in comparison to other regional conflicts, was a low priority even for the UN. However, there was pressure within the UN to maintain the momentum of negotiations even if the staff recommendation might be to suspend the process.

A few participants observed that the session was too academic. It seemed to be detached from the realities of Cyprus and the underlying physical, communal, and cultural fears. Tatar argued that some politicians too often appealed to the fears and sufferings of the past. Instead, they should be reassuring their respective populations that their security concerns were being taken into account. However, a majority of participants agreed that the concepts presented offered a useful framework with which to enhance third-party intervention.

4. Cypriot Perceptions

Elias Georgiades in his presentation, Where Are We?, saw hopeful signs in the good working relationships between the two leaders and the resurgent UN interest in negotiations. He foresaw a continuing role for the UN as third-party facilitator whose functions were to: promote new relationships; provide additional information and support; prevent a focus on past actions; and encourage the parties to generate their own solution. Both parties must orient their approach towards a problem to be solved, as opposed to a battle to be won. As noted in the sessions discussing conflict resolution, having only two parties to a dispute made the adoption of compromise positions more difficult.

The key areas to be resolved were the security and forced division issues. The parallel security problems in particular must be considered together, this being a more important issue than constitutional aspects. Any solution should include provisions for the following: a bicommunal but unified country; equitable territorial provisions for the constituent communal components; an effective federal system; and a secure de-militarized republic free from the possibility of external interference.

Because of the gap that existed between this objective and current negotiating positions, accommodations would be required. The following issues would be the most difficult to resolve: the presence of Turkish military forces and settlers; universal application of human rights -- particularly the three freedoms; and unilateral intervention rights.

Constantin Stephanou was also optimistic about future prospects for a settlement, but foresaw an increased role for the EC beyond UN efforts. At present, the majority of Cypriots do not want to live together with members of the other community. Gradualism and the extension of confidence-building measures would be required before security and identity concerns could be overcome. Stephanou proposed four steps to implement confidence-building measures, namely: freedom of access throughout the island for visits; common points of exit and entrance for the international movement of goods and people; opening of Famagusta Harbour and the Nicosia Airport as joint operations; and reduction of Turkish forces to a level comparable to the National Guard.

To achieve acceptance of the three freedoms, Stephanou proposed a combination of territorial adjustments to accommodate the bulk of the refugees and financial compensation for the remainder. Very few displaced Cypriots would want to return to their former homes if compensation was an option. Even after their return to their former homes, refugees' political rights might have to be deferred during a transitional period. He also saw the fiscal harmonization policy of the EC as a guide for the levying of taxes and for transfer payments within a federal Cyprus.

The discussion concentrated on an examination of examples of internal barriers in federal states. Stephanou saw importance in the absence of physical barriers, not in technical or jurisdictional barriers. If the physical barriers were removed, there would be little requirement for other barriers because very few Greek Cypriots would want to return and live under a Turkish Cypriot administration. This opened the question of recognition. Christofides suggested that withholding recognition and the normalization of relations was the only bargaining chip available to the Greek Cypriots. The gradual erosion of this asset would reduce the incentives towards achieving a comprehensive arrangement.

Fisher highlighted some of the difficulties which would be experienced in re-establishing inter-group contacts. He disagreed with Stephanou on the degree to which a legal framework would be required before initiating step-by-step confidence-building measures.

Providing a Turkish Cypriot perspective on the prospects of a settlement, Tatar emphasized his perception of the Greek Cypriot desire for enosis and the sense of insecurity that is felt by Turkish Cypriots. Commenting on the rebuilding of Europe after WW II and suggesting that the Swiss federation might be an example for Cyprus, Tatar expressed hope that a settlement could be found.

Kelman suggested that historical accounts could be useful in understanding the sources of current concerns and, thus, would be relevant to problem-solving. Several speakers warned about the dangers of focusing exclusively on the past by overemphasising historical or legalistic arguments. Karpat agreed that, given the Turkish Cypriot's past history of insecurity, the Greek Cypriot community should openly demonstrate its

willingness to accommodate security concerns. Bahceli asked whether the Greek Cypriot community would agree to Turkish Cypriot sovereignty over some part of the island, given appropriate territorial redistribution and security arrangements. Georgiades answered that the Greek Cypriots were committed to functional bi-zonality and to international guarantees.

The question of bi-zonality revived earlier discussion on the form of the federal system. There were distinct differences of opinion on the concept of equal participation in a federal state. Georgiades suggested that two separate states was not a federal system. Other speakers said that security guarantees were not possible in a federal solution based on majority rule. Çamlioglu closed this discussion by reminding participants that the underlying requirement for a lasting peace was a serious commitment on the part of the two communities to accept living together.

The session served to illustrate the connotations attached to words and phrases as well as the historical evolution of these connotations. Participants could generally agree that a bi-zonal federal system was probably the most appropriate form for an eventual settlement. However, there was no agreement on details in such areas as distribution of powers, fiscal arrangements, application of human rights, security provisions, or other constituent portions of prospective solutions. Indeed, the same words often had widely differing connotations to the two communities.

In spite of these differences, there was a consensus that increased contacts between the communities were highly desirable. Only through such contacts could confidence-building measures be conceived and evolve in a climate that ensured some degree of acceptance and success.

5. The Future Role of the United Nations

Indar Jit Rikhye identified the main issues in the Cyprus conflict as: security; territory; economics; local, regional and international politics; and the relations between the leaders on the island. The best security for one side has been perceived as total insecurity for the other. New thinking by all parties is required to devise a formula of mutual security incorporating an acceptable system of international guarantee. Referring to the principles of consent and cooperation, Rikhye reminded participants that the UN

could not impose a solution and that UNFICYP could function effectively only with the cooperation of all concerned parties.

Rikhye also recommended the revival of economic projects funded by the United Nations and individual countries. This would provide practical demonstration of the benefits of cooperation. Such demonstrations were required to permit escape from entrenched positions or principles. The ongoing talks are an opportunity for the leaders to take risks and encourage their respective communities to express their political will for a settlement. The continued presence of UNFICYP was an essential requirement for the success of the Secretary-General's current initiative.

James Holger, in his presentation, Where Do We Go From Here?, argued that the current international trend towards conflict resolution would not, of itself, inevitably extend to Cyprus. Considerable effort would be required on the part of concerned members of the international community because good offices were a weak mechanism for the resolution of conflict. The current series of talks were important but deadlines, though important demonstrations of resolve, should not necessarily be seen as indicating failure if not met. The focus for negotiations had been political, particularly issues of security, and more recently economic issues. But now the time was ripe for the application of a sociological approach. The underlying subjective components of the conflict could perhaps be explored in a series of problem-solving workshops. Without this social-psychological component, third party efforts to resolve the objective issues would fail.

James Jonah also stressed the importance of the international community, particularly for selling an acceptable solution. Such a solution, in the eyes of the United Nations and the world community, must include the affirmation of universal principles -- such as the non-occupation of foreign sovereign land. Because of this, the continued occupation of territory in Cyprus is not included in options considered by the UN. However, the principle of guarantees is accepted by the UN. Perhaps Turkish bases, similar to the British Sovereign Bases, remain as a possible option for resolving the two opposing principles.

Jonah cited strong opposition at the United Nations, particularly from the Third World countries, to unilateral military intervention of one state in another. For this reason, the United Nations had to engage in extensive consultation through good offices

rather than more direct intervention techniques. Like Holger, Jonah regarded UNFICYP as an essential requirement to permit good office negotiations to proceed.

Herbert Kelman addressed the key role of the UN as a third party within a problem-solving framework with the Secretary-General playing the role of facilitator between the leaders of the two communities. This approach would be limited if it remained restricted to top-level decision making. Like Holger and Rikhye, he called for more in-depth lower-level discussions and communal contacts.

Kelman also proposed a division of labour: negotiations among the Secretary-General and the two leaders at the top, and talks between non-official representatives from each community. These more informal contacts could better deal with social-psychological, cultural, and educational issues. Jonah responded that, although the Secretary-General could not directly organize this division of labour, he certainly would not reject the idea of informal groups fostering intercommunal communications at the lower level. Other speakers commented on the role of CIIPS and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in the role of fostering such talks.

Jean-Luc Pepin opened a discussion on the assistance which the international community could provide to the negotiating process. He noted the apparent absence of pressure by external sources to encourage the parties to the conflict to make substantive progress in negotiations. Charles Svoboda questioned the assistance being provided to the Secretary-General by the two mother countries. Jonah indicated that the lack of secrecy and confidentiality in Cyprus was a considerable impediment to external assistance. He noted that the Secretary-General had carried out extensive consultations with external powers. However, Cyprus was perceived by many as not requiring immediate attention because the situation was seen to be under control. Even Greece and Turkey did not always regard Cyprus as a pressing issue.

The session concluded with several other suggestions to assist the UN in its third-party role. Loizos recommended that a greater portion of the costs of UNFICYP be assessed to Greece and Turkey, and that the good office efforts of the Secretary-General be rationed to situations where there was a genuine desire to reach an accommodation. Rikhye observed that advance consideration of UNFICYP mandate renewal could be utilized as a greater incentive to progress than at present.

SESSION SUMMARY

There was a general consensus that there was a continuing role for the United Nations to play in resolving the Cyprus conflict. Participants gained clearer appreciation of the kinds of support which could be offered to the United Nations in order to foster contacts and trust between the communities. There was also a general consensus that a social-psychological approach to problem-solving was an area which merited further investigation and practical implementation, even if this had to be facilitated by private or unofficial agencies.

FINAL WORKSHOP CONSIDERATION

During the Seminar which concluded the public meeting phase of the project, a final workshop session considered the analysis, concepts, and recommendations brought out in the three previous Workshops. The aim was to draw together the progressive experience, insight, and personal interactions of the participants into a comprehensive review of the theme.

John Halstead, the chairperson of the session, began by mentioning the twenty-five-year presence of UNFICYP -- with Canada as a troop contributor -- in Cyprus, without progress towards a settlement. He posed future-oriented questions: Is the UN part of the solution or part of the problem? Do the parties want to settle or to win? Can step-by-step negotiations succeed if there is no agreement on the shape of the final outcome? Must Athens and Ankara be involved in the settlement? Can confidence-building measures, reassurance, and economic cooperation, contribute to an eventual settlement? Is a hurting stalemate necessary to trigger the resolution process? Should the third-party role be to assist the parties already committed to a formal negotiation process, or, to assist parties to create conditions for negotiations?

He also put forward some thoughts on the concept of mutual security, based on a mutually beneficial relationship. Confidence calls for a degree of balance, stability, and predictability in a relationship based on reassurance, transparency, and verification.

Rikhye pointed out that both Cypriot parties did have security at the present time. Greek Cypriot participants did not agree. Rikhye said that Greek Cypriots rely heavily on the UN presence, but Turkish Cypriots find UNFICYP merely tolerable. Their security is assured by the Turkish forces. He continued by asking what kind of incentive could convince the Turkish side to be part of a federal solution, and, thus, for the present "government" to relinquish some powers. He thought that economics was no longer an element of persuasion towards unification for northern Cyprus, where tourism is also thriving. He did not see an incentive towards settlement coming from the two motherlands. He was also skeptical as to the role of the other European countries including Britain, the former colonial power. He did not see basic changes in the role of the Secretary-General. Consequently, he proposed a reduction of the UN troops on the island. The comfort of security provided by UNICYP reduces the incentive for both parties to reach an agreement.

Robert Mitchell saw the UN role as one which would includes monitoring any agreement reached by the two communities, rather than as a means of ensuring their respective security. He also thought troop reduction would be a worthwhile approach. Simple technical measures, such as lighting the buffer zone, could mean greater effectiveness with fewer peacekeepers. The advantages in troop training was acknowledged but also contrasted with a certain sense of cynicism and a lessening of the UN's prestige in the eyes of soldiers.

It was agreed that the funding and cost-sharing issue was an important aspect of the UN presence on Cyprus, and in peacekeeping in general.

Georgiades observed that Greek Cypriots did not feel secure in the situation which the continued presence of UNFICYP seems to have institutionalized. He thought that Cyprus provided a good model for future successful peacemaking involvement by the international community.

Halstead summed up the major points. The problem is still intractable; history has few examples of divided countries re-uniting. The two communities look at security in incompatible ways. Each side is trying to optimize the balance between advantages and disadvantages for its own community in reaching a solution. Perceptions and positions of the two communities are complicated by the positions of other interested parties,

including Greece and Turkey. Because the UN has been instrumental in providing security, there has not been pressure on the parties to reach the compromises needed for a lasting resolution. The financing problem is an increasing hindrance to the UN role which needs to be addressed. The lack of progress reflects badly on the prestige of the UN; the UN has adopted a routine attitude and has perhaps overlooked ways of progressing more actively towards a solution.

Halstead began a discussion of the future by saying that no community could achieve its own security in an absolute sense; it can achieve it only if the other community also feels secure. Some participants argued that there would be no security gains for Turkish Cypriots in joining the Greek Cypriots to form a federal structure, the sole incentive being uncertain economic prospects. Rather, the prospect of joining the EC was seen as a much stronger incentive towards resolution.

Sherry suggested that UNFICYP be adapted to fulfil other tasks. This would change its role from an emergency measure to more of a long-term instrument essential to a situation where certain problems are insoluble. This new UN peacekeeping role could, perhaps, be extended elsewhere in the Middle East and, thus, more fully contribute to real peacemaking.

Rikhye thought that UNFICYP was essential for continued negotiations to succeed; however, the structure could be reshaped to provide a greater incentive for the two parties to reach an agreement. An early renewal and discussion process at the Security Council would make the mandate renewal of UNFICYP a more efficient pressure point. UNFICYP should become a smaller observer system reinforced with quick reaction capabilities. Continuous pressure should be put on the parties to reinforce the necessity for substantive progress.

William Barton summed up his view on funding. The present funding system is not a fair burden-sharing method. For many governments it is an easy way to get along without doing anything. Unless pressure is applied, those governments will not move. The date of renewal could be advanced. However, the troop contributors should say that they are not prepared to accept the present way of financing UNFICYP, and that they want progress to be demonstrated before the next renewal date. Canada should act in unison with the other troop contributors. Barton emphasized the need for the US and

UK -- both permanent members of the UN Security Council -- to take an active role in this context.

In summing up discussion, Halstead said that there were no signs of a long-term solution in the Cyprus conflict. The perceived costs of concessions seem greater than the benefits of a settlement. A longer-term process is required to build up a community of interest and trust between the parties. The UN should maintain its peacekeeping role, but should begin to emphasize its peacemaking role, and to alleviate the problem associated with the funding issue.

FINAL WORKSHOP REPORT

Halstead presented a summary of workshop findings and conclusions to the Seminar in plenary session. The Cyprus situation was seen as a stubborn problem which has resisted settlement for twenty-five years. The basic problem is security and the fact that the two communities have looked at the security factor in fundamentally different ways. The lack of progress from peacekeeping to peacemaking reflects adversely upon the international prestige of the UN. Cynicism may develop about the organization's effectiveness. The UN role in Cyprus may have become too routine and thus may not contribute toward a solution.

Participants agreed that the UN has little choice but to continue its peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. However, the structure and operations of the UN force should be designed, not to re-enforce the status quo, but to favour the movement from peacekeeping to peacemaking. This might be done by reorganizing UNFICYP as an observer force backed up by a reaction force designed primarily to support a UN political presence in Cyprus, and by ensuring that the periodic extensions of the UNFICYP mandate are planned and authorized not less than one month before the mandate expires.

A strong consensus supported the recommendation that the UNFICYP financing system should be reformed. One way of doing this would be for troop contributors to inform the Security Council that they are unwilling to continue to support UNFICYP under the present system. They should warn the Security Council that, it no better solution is found by the time the next extension is considered, the troop contributors will withdraw.

THEME IV - ECONOMICS AND PEACEBUILDING

OVERVIEW

Only three sessions during the course of the Workshops and Seminar were formally devoted to economic issues. Nevertheless, nearly every session included discussion of the economic aspects of the Cyprus problem: the division of taxation and economic regulatory powers in a federal system; the economic potential for peacebuilding and reconciliation; and the economic viability of the constituent parts of a federal system.

In order not to disrupt the unity of presentations, and not to fragment related portions of proposed solutions or perspectives on settlement, economic aspects were retained in their original context. Thus, consideration of economic regulatory power and taxation are found in the sessions related to Constitution and Government Organization (Workshop I) and Preconditions for a Viable Federal System (Workshop II). Where economic proposals formed part of a proposed plan of settlement, they have been retained in the session on Alternative Perspectives on a Settlement.

There were three main areas remaining for discussion under the theme, Economics and Peacebuilding:

1. economic aspects of communal conflict;
2. working at cooperation; and
3. the economic potential of Cyprus.

1. Economic Aspects of Communal Conflict

Louis Christofides structured his paper around the economic concepts of preference, self-interest, and constraints. He posed two main questions: What did the parties want to achieve? What was the environment in which they had to operate?

After a brief overview of the historical evolution of the Greek Cypriots, Christofides identified their preferences as:

a. security -- for example, ending the presence of the Turkish army;
b. resolving refugee problems including compensation for and repossession of property; and
c. ending the wasteful duplication of economic activities and infrastructure.

Christofides argued that Turkish Cypriot preferences were less easily defined because the long-term objectives of the Turkish Cypriot leadership were not clear. This ambiguity was due to the economic, demographic, and military interactions of mainland Turkey with northern Cyprus. Security and identity were the major concerns of Turkish Cypriots rather than economics. Turkish preferences were more consistent with the status quo, despite the expenditures on military and development aid in northern Cyprus.

Christofides identified mutual benefits from trade as primary means of breaking the deadlock situation and as necessary components of the final formula binding the parties together. The disadvantage would be the creation of economic losers within each community who would, therefore, oppose such a "final" formula. An alternative formula for trade and exchange could involve territorial adjustments, as well as the shared development of communication and transport infrastructures, trade links, and tourism flows. Nevertheless, an incremental approach of this nature would be difficult to achieve because of security concerns and the lack of any consensus about the eventual constitutional status of Cyprus. Both parties remain to be convinced that possible intermediate steps would not be prejudicial to any final solution based on their described preferences.

Despite the two communities' shared interest in changing the present situation, the reluctance in the South to engage in piecemeal tinkering, and Turkey's lack of interest in a new outcome, made an agreement difficult. Recognizing that a peacebuilding strategy based on economic cooperation might be viable in the long run, Christofides advised against creating an elaborate fiscal system at an early stage. Instead, he suggested the fostering of a common Cypriot identity -- as opposed to Greek and Turkish ones -- to be directly linked to the success of any federal solution.

Ozay Mehmet argued that it was time to shift the focus of the Cyprus problem away from historical and legal concerns, towards a conflict resolution economic agenda. In his paper he investigated options for both the economic regime and the division of economic powers in a future federal Cyprus. The two communities could more easily

reach agreement on the issues of fiscal, monetary, and employment policies than on political and legal policies.

Mehmet described the Cyprus problem as one of legitimacy and applied the concept of rational economic behaviour to Cypriots. The result of rival nationalisms was continuing mistrust based on mutual fear and frustration. Each community was obsessed with a chronic anxiety that any concession to the other community would spell its own cultural demise.

Assuming a bi-zonal federal Cyprus, Mehmet identified the required condition for stability as shared prosperity through the elimination of regional disparities. This would require separation of economic and fiscal powers; equalization payments; and a monetary union with a limited free trade arrangement. Each State must have territorial jurisdiction on individual and corporate taxes, as well as residual powers to regulate natural resources, industry, trade, transport, and professional licensing. The States should also hold exclusive jurisdiction over language, religion, and culture. Mehmet foresaw the federal jurisdiction as being restricted to a well defined economic domain encompassing such things as monetary policy and international trade.

The role of a neutral federal government should be the promotion of equalization between communities and among citizens. Income disparities between communities could be closed by a system of equalization payments. The Greek Cypriots would bear the largest burden because of their advantageous economic position. Implementation planning would have to counter any tendency toward a permanent economic dependency of the north on the south. Mehmet continued with a description of a limited Cypriot free trade area where, among other things, some forms of restrictions to mobility would be implemented. Assisting equalization would be a regional industrial strategy fostered by taxing powers for each State. Mehmet argued that these regulations, rights, and equalization devices were consistent with Canadian federal practices and, thus, have been proven to be, to some degree, practical and realistic.

Without those devices, an unregulated, free trade Cypriot federation would mean the economic domination of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots. Without mobility regulations the Turkish Cypriots would become a minority in their part of the federation. Citing the parallel with the Canadian situation and the two founding nations, Mehmet recommended

a loose federal economic regime for Cyprus to permit the coordination of the economic and political situations. Implementation would include a confidence-building transition period, whose length would depend on the speed of elimination of economic disparities between the two communities.

While praising the creativity of Mehmet's proposals, Sigler emphasized the specificity of each federation experience, and the absence of a single all-purpose federal model. Perrakis had similar reservations on the use of Canada as an example for Cyprus. Canadian equalization payments have been criticized for not really performing their assigned task. Economists condemned the restrictions and rights of regulation for a market the size of Canada. They would be even less appropriate in a Cypriot market of less than one million, Perrakis observed. Mehmet agreed, but argued that economic restrictions were necessary to maintain a demographic majority of Turkish Cypriots in the north during an extended peacebuilding period.

Soysal said that Mehmet's concepts coincided with ideas circulating among the Turkish Cypriot leadership on economic matters. He described transfer payments as an investment in "Cypriotness" on the part of Greek Cypriots. However, several other participants thought that Mehmet's concept relied too much on the political willingness of Greek Cypriots to fund the equalization payments under a federated system. Economic matters, Dobell said, could not be isolated from legal, political, and constitutional issues. Mehmet's interpretation was that economic issues, particularly tax and regulation rights, contributed to the feeling of insecurity in the Turkish Cypriot community, as much as purely political and military factors. Roberts wondered if it would not be possible to diminish the bi-polar nature of the problem by having a three or four zone federation. Perhaps this would make the equalization payments look more like a unity device than like a federation bribe.

The above points led to a general discussion of the significance of the threat of Greek Cypriot economic domination to the survival of the Turkish Cypriot community. Also discussed was the contradiction between regional taxing powers and the federal obligation of equalization payments. Christofides saw this contradiction as the key argument against the equalization payments solution. In response, Mehmet put forward the small, poor Canadian province of Prince Edward Island -- which has jurisdiction over important areas of regulatory powers -- as an example of the feasibility of his approach.

Wellsman commented that many engineering experts doubted the economic viability of projects suggested by Christofides such as the reconstruction of the Nicosia airport. Retaining such projects, which may have been previously viable but are now political symbols, was disadvantageous to the negotiating process. Christofides agreed that the specifics of the projects were less important than the will to move towards cooperative economic projects during intercommunal talks.

2. Working at Cooperation

To assist participants in understanding both the difficulties and potential of peacebuilding and economic cooperation, three speakers described their personal involvement in these activities. Alistair Robertson is a Canadian engineer working for a Canadian company in Nicosia. Lellos Demetriades and Mustafa Akinci are representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities of Nicosia.

Robertson provided an overview of the history and ongoing work involved in the Nicosia sewer project. At the end of the 1960s, the city of Nicosia was in need of proper sanitary sewage and drainage systems. Robertson's firm was retained to study and report on a system serving all of Nicosia. Design of the first stages commenced in 1969 and construction began in 1972.

Eighty kilometres of sewers and twenty-seven kilometres of house connections had been installed by 1974 but the system was not completed and could not function properly. Fighting in Nicosia damaged some of the work that had been completed. The slope of the ground meant that it was prohibitively expensive and difficult to reconstruct two separate systems to serve the separate halves of the municipality.

In 1976, Demetriades and Akinci started to meet with United Nations Development Plan (UNDP) representatives -- under UNFICYP supervision -- to develop an agreement on the sewage, drainage, and water problems. An agreement was reached in 1978 to complete the work, the contract being divided into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot parts. The sewers had to be installed through many of the barricades which had been erected by the two sides along the Green Line. The World Bank, the EC, the US, and

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided the bulk of funds for this series of projects.

The fluctuating Turkish lira sometimes became a problem in evaluating the costs, and some contracts had to be re-evaluated and renegotiated several times. Careful and complicated arrangements often had to be made for the purchase and delivery of building materials and equipment -- especially when they had to come to the Greek Cypriot side from a Turkish Cypriot port (and vice-versa), or when official payments had to be made on the other side. Sometimes there were no adequate subcontractors with whom to deal, especially on the Turkish Cypriot side. UN agencies were often used as intermediaries in those cases.

Special provisions including obligatory UNFICYP escorts and advance notification were devised to carry out work in the Buffer Zone. Constant briefing and emergency meetings were required in order to prevent apparently minor trangressions from developing into hostile reactions from the respective military forces. A few incidents did occur from time to time. In May 1980 Demetriades and Akinci announced that the system was in operation.

To date, ten contracts have been finished, and two remain. Most of the streets which were excavated to install sewers and water mains have now been repaved. Robertson acknowledged the cooperation of both the National Guard and the Turkish Army, as well as all the UN agencies present, but emphasized the great dedication and efforts of Demetriades and Akinci.

Participants, recognizing the potential for other projects, wondered what other areas of technical cooperation had been investigated. Robertson suggested that the sewer project had created a precedent for cooperation by showing that it is possible. As well, continued cooperation was required to maintain and operate the system. Electricity and water supplies were potentially the best areas for further cooperation.

Akinci described how he and Demetriades initiated cooperation in order to have both water and sewage systems function properly after the events of 1974 had cut Nicosia into two parts. The success of the sewage system led them to undertake a larger project, the Nicosia Master Plan, dealing with the future development of the city

-- even if there were less urgent reasons to do so compared to the water systems projects. This plan had to take into account the possibility of a continuing status quo, the option of a federal solution to the Cyprus conflict, or other developments -- no buffer zone, for example.

Akinci discussed the funding methods related to different projects in the Nicosia area. The Greek Cypriot side often received funds in proportion to their numbers on the island as a whole and not with respect to their numbers in Nicosia. In the area of "Nicosia within the Walls," bisected by the green line, the proportions are weighted towards Turkish Cypriots.

Akinci also mentioned the success of a cultural event: a Greek play in Turkish, performed in the Greek sector of Nicosia, in front of a Greek Cypriot audience. He wished cooperation could have started earlier, by recognizing Turkish municipalities among other things. Whatever the content of a future federal solution, it was obvious that there would be provisions for two local governments in Nicosia's two sectors, with agencies to facilitate coordination. Continued cooperation was needed in new, as well as existing, areas even if a comprehensive solution was not reached in the near future. Cooperation at the level described should continue even if there were pressures from the respective Cypriot authorities to avoid such cooperation.

Akinci stressed the importance of pursuing the process of 'deconfrontation' on the Green Line to reduce frictions. Efforts should also be exerted for a bicommunal university, accessible to both Turkish and Greek Cypriot youth. Nicosia, he concluded, was better prepared than the rest of the island for the eventuality of a federal solution.

Responding to Akinci's comments on funding, Lellos Demetriades said that other issues such as the relative value of money -- due to different costs of living -- had also to be taken into account. However, successful arrangements were always possible between people of good will.

Demetriades discussed the problems and obstacles which labels and titles pose to cooperation between representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities. In his and Akinci's case, minutes and official documents were avoided because they often blocked advances in attempts at cooperation. Cooperation was the result of necessity, as well as

the will and good faith of the people concerned. Some, on both sides, are against any kind of cooperation in Nicosia, although it might be beneficial to the city and to Cyprus in general. Demetriades concluded by observing that, if you help your neighbour, you help yourself.

The evolution of the constitutional legitimacy and status of Turkish municipalities in Cyprus was debated without reaching a comprehensive consensus on the legal issues at stake. Pragmatically, it was pointed out that there is no absolute need to agree on this in order to cooperate, as long as specific labels are not used.

Answering a question on future areas of cooperation, Akinci recommended common cultural events to be held in the neutral UN Buffer Zone to begin with, expanding later to both zones. Another priority was changing the image of Cyprus and its constituent communities among young people through extended contacts. The speakers anticipated difficulties involving 'deconfrontation' steps along the narrowest parts of the buffer zone in Nicosia, but stressed the importance of continuing this process.

Stavrinides wondered whether cooperation at the level of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Unions of Municipalities could help tackle more global issues -- such as the environment. Both Akinci and Demetriades pointed out the need to involve new generations of Cypriots in various areas of possible cooperation.

3. Economic Potential of Cyprus

Semih Vaner's presentation dealt mainly with Turkish relations with the European Community. Cyprus' future depends to some extent on the nature of Turkey's relations with the EC and Greece. It is an issue in internal Greek and Turkish politics, while, at the same time, a concern in their international policies.

Vaner cited not only financial but also cultural problems in EC-Turkey relations. Although there had been a negative perception of Europe during the Ottoman period, today there has evolved a Turkish perception of Europe as a referent of quality. Overall, Turks support the integration of their country with Europe. One problem not often discussed is the difficulty of integrating the concept of the supremacy of the Turkish State, into a supranational European system.

In contrast, many Europeans doubt that Turkey belongs to the same cultural base--language, religion, etc. -- as the rest of Europe. There seems to exist a persistent negative image of the "Orient" in Europe. For example, an immutable Islam is perceived as an obstacle on the way to modernity. Other more technical matters include the size and growth of the Turkish population and the emigration problems this might pose for parts of Europe. The suppression of labour unions and minority and human rights in Turkey is also of concern in Europeans. These perceptions are obviously not shared by the Turks but they do have negative repercussions on their international and European relations.

The perceptions that Europeans have of Turkey influence the way in which they look at the Cyprus conflict, at Turkey's role in Cyprus, and at the Turkish Cypriot community. Moreover, Greece's use of its EC member status further distorts European perceptions and group representations on these issues. Other EC members often use this apparently Greek diplomatic obstruction as an alibi, avoiding the need to put forward reasons for their own reluctance to grant Turkey full membership.

Thus, full membership for Turkey is quite unlikely in the short term. What is important, said Vanen, is to foresee the evolution of EC-Turkey relations and how this evolution will be influenced by the situation in Cyprus.

The northern part of the island has undergone development in some respects--transport infrastructure, higher education, and public administration -- but retains fears of Greek Cypriot economic dominance. Overall, Turkish Cypriots are engaged in a one-on-one relationship with Turkey that is not always advantageous. This was a result of the isolation in which they found themselves and which had occurred in spite of the EC orientation of the trade from northern Cyprus.

Constantin Stephanou's paper dealt with the implications of a single internal market and financial solidarity arrangement -- with reference to the EC example -- for a federated Cyprus. A single internal market within Cyprus need not, as in the case of the EC, be completely deregulated. The Cypriot federation should have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction in all the areas affected by, or likely to be affected by, Community legislation.

To implement the Association Agreement, Cyprus had to abolish duties on goods originating with the EC, and align its external tariffs with those of the EC. If it applied to join the EC, Cyprus would transfer duty proceeds of non-EC trade to the Community. In a federally constituted Cyprus, the implementation of EC directives on indirect taxation should be exclusively a federal matter. As well, the central federal authority should also have exclusive jurisdiction on physical borders and technical barriers -- such as standards, and certification -- so as to avoid communal frictions. Enforcement of this legislation could be delegated to the federated entities. Existing EC laws on the free movement of persons and services, would require that a federal settlement in Cyprus provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federation in immigration as well as corporate and international law. In order to deal with both a federal Cyprus harbouring off-shore activities and potential EC minimum rates of taxes on corporations, the Federation should, as in Switzerland, reserve the right to raise a withholding tax. Cyprus should carefully monitor the abolition of restrictions on movements of capital.

To facilitate the establishment of a single internal market, the EC also has a full array of directives -- social and environmental policies -- aimed at eliminating distortions of competition. The federal level of government should have at least concurrent, if not exclusive, jurisdiction on the matter, including the management of water resources.

Stephanou then discussed the implementation of the principle of financial solidarity according to a system of horizontal revenue sharing. He proposed a system based on automatic transfers from the more developed to the less developed regions of the federation. For example, a Greek Cypriot entity would raise taxes of $1,500 per capita compared to $500 for the Turkish Cypriot entity. Transfer payments would then be the $1000 difference times the number of Turkish Cypriot citizens: an amount of about $100 million. This would clearly demonstrate the solidarity of the Greek Cypriot community with the Turkish Cypriot community and would provide a strong argument for economic union.

In his presentation, Ahmet Aker's thesis was that the best means to bring the two communities together is to devise economic measures that would benefit both sides. These measures would have an advantage over political initiatives, in that they could

produce measurable and financially profitable results in a short period of time. In the case of the EC, it was originally the economic benefits that paved the way to later political collaboration.

Three important principles should guide the choice of the appropriate economic measures: quick tangible results, benefits to both states, and an output large enough to yield positive results after one side or the other is compensated. Aker proposed a "Fund for the Economic Development of the North," because of the importance of reducing the economic disparity between the partners. Contributions could come both from the more prosperous areas of Cyprus and from the outside.

With respect to trade within Cyprus, Aker thought that a first step would be restricted movement of goods and labour between the two communities. This should be regulated in order to avoid 'dumping' and inflation. It would also take into account the different economic structures and levels of development of the two communities. Later, an arrangement could be reached to phase out restrictions gradually. There is a possible problem -- through a previous agreement with the EC, there is a nine percent reduction of tariffs on goods coming from the Community and the less prosperous areas may be reluctant to implement this provision.

Both sides should be able to benefit from the large Cypriot tourism industry. The possibility of free movement of people between the north and the south was linked to the question of property and compensation for the displaced. A first step might be the opening of all areas of Nicosia to both communities. However, some kind of regulation should accompany the movement of labour between the two sides. This would lessen any disruption caused by the sudden, direct contact of two very different wage levels--wages in the south are two to five times higher than in the north. Both sides should retain the right to import labour from third sources to avoid shortages.

Aker also proposed joint economic structures, including a "Joint Economic Commission of Cyprus," with experts from both sides. The necessary financial arrangements would include a Federal Bank of Cyprus, set up both to oversee the flow of aid to the north and to regulate the pace of economic exchange between both sides. Other Joint Commissions could be set up for maritime transport, air transport, postal services,

and agricultural marketing. Aker concluded that all of these possibilities assume some minimal commitment from both communities.

In his paper, Costas Apostolides described economics as a source of convergent interests for Cyprus. He emphasized the strength and potential of the Cypriot economy, while pointing out that military and political considerations had been and remain a threat to economic development on the island.

Apostolides noted the Greek Cypriot advantage in per capita GNP -- three-to-one in growth rates, productivity, infrastructure, and industrial modernization. Although it has recently been doing well, the Turkish Cypriot economy still has problems associated with the high inflation rates and the currency devaluation of the Turkish lira. The income differential between the two sides has increased. Apostolides argued that the divergence was a consequence of excessively large, unproductive public administration and agricultural sectors in the north, as well as, and perhaps more importantly, their close relationship to a problem-ridden Turkish economy. Economic factors have always been perceived by the political leadership of the Turkish Cypriots as being subservient to political considerations.

Apostolides argued that, contrary to popular belief, Turkish Cypriots had received more foreign financial assistance per capita than Greek Cypriots in recent years. Turkish Cypriots have experienced a slower economic development, not because of a lack of transfer of funds, but because of the way these funds were spent. This, he suggested, made transfer payments almost irrelevant as a way to reduce the development gap between the two sides. The basic mechanism for the attainment of economic equalization should be the freedom to trade and the mobility of the means of production. Turkish Cypriots would hold an advantage by such an approach, provided that an appropriate adjustment process is agreed upon in order to avoid violent economic shocks. The opening up of Varosha was proposed as a first step.

Apostolides warned that an economic settlement might jeopardize the possibility of a broader political settlement. He proceeded to list Vassiliou's economic proposals. These included: the general "equal opportunity" principles; the gradual application of federal and provincial economic and tax jurisdiction -- for example, the Central Bank and Customs to be of exclusive federal jurisdiction; and the advantages of an integrated

economy. Although the Turkish Cypriot side did not seem to be reducing its tariff on EC imports, it was, like the Greek Cypriot side, benefitting from the Customs Union Agreement that the Republic of Cyprus had signed with the EC. Thus, the EC is a strong convergence factor not only for both Cypriot communities, but also regionally for Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Perhaps improved relations with Turkey would make Cyprus an important off-shore and international services centre, to the benefit of both communities.

Discussion began with the difficulty of using comparative statistics. Aker estimated a fifty percent advantage in purchasing power for the Greek Cypriot side, while Apostolides' figure was a three-to-one advantage for Greek Cypriots. Aker and Apostolides also disagreed on the gap in per capita GDP between the two communities, and in the general evaluation of the disparity between the two communities' levels of economic development.

Akinci took issue with Aker's figure of $4,000 US for the per capita income in the north, repeating that the official figure was $2000 US. He questioned the wisdom of importing cheap labour from Turkey, when young Turkish Cypriots were leaving the island for job opportunities elsewhere. Akinci also challenged Apostolides on the costing and exchange of public utilities on the island.

Tatar said that, in the past, Greek Cypriot authorities had blocked joint economic projects because of questions of recognition. Demetriades replied that Turkish Cypriots often used the bait of economic joint projects to achieve de facto recognition. Greek Cypriots would then be accused of 'backing off' when they refused to agree on official labelling in negotiations, which could be understood as a measure of recognition of the TRNC. He and Akinci reached agreement on common projects as plain "representatives." Aker answered that his idea of a joint economic commission could function in the same way that the two municipal representatives work together.

McDonald argued that considerable amounts of development aid money could be obtained from sources such as the US fund to promote cooperation, and by diverting funds allocated to arms purchases and troops maintenance. These funds would be available if Greek Cypriots granted recognition to a federated Turkish Cypriot State in

the north, and if the Turkish army -- as well as Greek officers -- withdrew from the the island.

Salem doubted whether economic agreements could be used as confidence-building measures to lead to a settlement. Economic incentives may be more useful as a means to keep the political process going after a political settlement is achieved. Apostolides thought that economic confidence-building measures need not be an impediment to the political process if they benefit both sides at the same time. Aker was convinced that any agreed measure would indeed benefit both sides and would contribute towards a political settlement. He also stressed the urgency of regulating the movement of goods and labour between the two sides in Cyprus.

SESSION SUMMARY

There emerged a general consensus that the EC would become an increasingly important third party in the region because of existing and growing links with Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. There was also agreement that in any resolution of the Cypriot problem, there would be winners and losers as comparative economic advantage changed. For this reason, there exists considerable support for the status quo and reluctance to adopt the gradual approach of economic cooperation. This reluctance was reinforced by questions of legitimacy and the fear that a gradual approach might prejudice a final agreement.

The intensity of feeling at some of the presentations revealed that it is not completely possible to separate economic cooperation from history and politics. Nevertheless, participants agreed that the examples of cooperation offered by Robertson, Demetriades, and Akinci were models for future initiatives. There was a role for the Cypriot communities, for international agencies, and for other governments to propose and support future efforts in this direction.

FINAL WORKSHOP CONSIDERATION

During the Seminar which concluded the meeting phase of the project, a final Workshop session considered the analyses, concepts, and recommendations brought out during the three previous Workshops. The aim was to draw together the progressive

experience, expertise, insight, and personal interactions of participants into a comprehensive review of the themes.

The chairperson of the session, John Sigler, started by describing the three parts encompassed in the peace process: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. The first refers to simply stopping the fighting. The second means engaging in diplomacy and negotiations. Finally, the third involves deeper cooperation over the long term. The essence of "new thinking," he said, is to recognize how pessimistic international relations theory was.

Mehmet discussed the importance of stability for proper peacebuilding. The breakdown of the 1960 Constitution was the kind of thing to avoid. The new constitution should be very carefully drafted, especially concerning the division of powers. Sustainability is imperative, and economic policy can be a lever for political stability. It should be possible to appeal to the rational behaviour of Cypriots, and to undertake peacebuilding by first dealing with bread and butter issues. It was in the interest of all Cypriots to have a federal system as, he thought, was the case in the Canadian system.

Breton made a few comments on the Canadian situation dealing with federalism, the constitution, and economics. He also discussed constitution-making in Cyprus. He argued for the minimum of regulations in order to decrease the antagonism between communities, particularly in movement of labour and goods. Christofides foresaw "enormous" gains from trade. However, he saw problems arising, for the Greek Cypriots especially, in land distribution and refugee claims. McDonald thought that if the Turkish Cypriots wanted a federation, there were many gestures it could make to foster it, but he was afraid that the present tendency was towards complete separation.

Tatar discussed the failure of the mini-package approach. Like Mehmet, he stressed the importance of a lasting framework of cooperation between the parties. Apostolides generally agreed with Tatar, and mentioned areas of concrete cooperation -- for example, Turkish Cypriot workers commuting to work on the Greek Cypriot side, and the experimental village of Pyla. It was possible to have many things work without getting involved in the intricate political issues. If these measures were to succeed, they would be a great incentive towards further progress. The issue of common infrastructure projects was seen as a clear example of possible cooperation.

Theodoropoulos voiced three warnings. Economic bonds are subject to pressures, especially in a context of group identity. Cyprus will not live in a glass case; there will be influences, including from Turkey. There is a need to have "two-way traffic" in economic relations between the two sides, a need for free movement of goods, services, and labour, as a trade-off for equalization payments.

Aker made the point that the Turkish Cypriot economic situation was not as bad as some thought, even though it has more problems than the Greek Cypriot economy. Generally, the Turkish Cypriot economy is getting more productive. In any case, both Cypriot economies have their trade geared towards Europe, and there is a need for a settlement for political rather than economic reasons. Aker also underlined the importance of the fund he mentioned in his own paper; this would require the participation of outside contributors.

Zafiriou noted that there was an apparent consensus about the benefits accruing to both communities due to additional economic relations. At the same time, the lack of mutual trust can be an obstacle to trade between the two parties. This important element of mistrust needs to be overcome.

Clayton Beattie suggested that peacebuilding should have been part of the UN involvement in the Cyprus conflict since the beginning along with peacekeeping (UNFICYP) and peacemaking (UN sponsored intercommunal talks), since all three components seem to be necessary for success.

Christofides identified various areas of cooperation including tourism, the Nicosia airport, a university, and ports facilities. Resolution of the issues of recognition and the presence of Turkish troops in the northern part of the island would greatly enhance chances of cooperation, including the reaching of a settlement.

Partly in response to arguments dealing with the free movement of goods and services, Aker observed that both economies would benefit from a transition period towards this freer trade. Apostolides agreed to a large extent with Aker, still emphasizing the difference in the production structure of the two economies, and in their level of adaptation to the European trade system. Like Aker, he thought the Turkish

Cypriot economy was not in such bad shape, certainly it was better endowed than the Turkish economy. Positive change could occur in the respective economies in quite a short period of time. The Turkish Cypriots benefited from the accord which the Republic had established with the EC, and their opinions were taken into account in the very few areas of difference with the Greek Cypriots. Afxentiou challenged the notion that Cypriots can build a thriving economy mainly on their own. A lot of the recent growth originated from the war in Lebanon. The Cypriot economy remained relatively fragile but the fundamental issue in the Cyprus problem was not economics but politics.

Mehmet came forward with a number of propositions: abolish the economic boycott against the Turkish Cypriot side; resettle Varosha, probably accommodating around 40,000 people; reopen Nicosia airport for the benefit of the two communities; set up a compensation fund for the settlement of refugee claims in both communities; and develop cooperative projects. A joint research centre for curriculum reform and a joint economic commission, with working committees to deal with public utilities and other issues, were put forward as possibilities.

Breton argued that it was very difficult to "get a federation going," mainly because it was perceived as a zero-sum game. Areas of positive-sum gains should be investigated to begin with, to build up momentum. He pushed for short transition periods, once the decision to go forward with a scaling down of tariffs is taken. Trade -- even rather successful, free trade -- is not the guarantee of a federation.

FINAL WORKSHOP REPORT

John Sigler presented a summary of workshop findings and conclusions to the seminar in plenary session. He referred to the Canadian experience of ethnic cleavages and federalism. It was recommended that Cypriot federal planners keep government intervention and regulation as minimal as possible in order to leave the economic life of the country as free of political passions as possible.

There was a discussion about "new thinking." The images of non-zero-sum game thinking and win-win solutions were said to come from economics while politics used zero-sum thinking. There was broad agreement in the group that it is possible to proceed by small, realistic steps. Gains can be made by exchanges; participants wondered

why this had not worked in the past in Cyprus. The heart of the failure was said to lie in the dominance of the old agenda of strongly opposed identities and zero-sum game attitudes over the potential benefits of economic exchanges.

A few confidence-building areas were discussed: Turkish Cypriot labourers in the South; dealing with the problem of smuggling; and establishment of working committees at the practical level. One concrete area for cooperation was the reopening of the Nicosia airport, perhaps initially under UN auspices. This would encourage cooperation in the shared interest of benefiting from tourism. The technical subject of harmonization of external tariffs was also said to suit the establishment of a joint committee. Integration would be made easier if both economies are doing well, because of the potential mutual gains.

Overall, even among economists, the primacy of the political aspect of Cyprus remained very high. Yet, small incremental steps, and further discussions among experts, can be taken, and should be encouraged.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As conceived and approved, the aim of the project was relatively limited. As a minimum it was hoped that it would lead to a deeper understanding of the issues and dynamics of a regional conflict situation. This was entirely in keeping with the Institute's mandate to increase knowledge and understanding of issues related to international peace and security from a Canadian perspective. It was hoped, however, that it might also be possible to develop options, recommendations and areas of cooperative investigation which could lead to a framework for increased economic cooperation, political reconciliation and enhanced regional stability. Altogether, the project was a major undertaking. Through the generous contribution of time and talent by workshop and seminar participants, the key research objectives were achieved. Almost 50 papers or major presentations were tabled during the course of the project. To these presentations must be added the parallel contribution of discussion, debate and analysis. The record of this contribution forms an important part of the overall project documentation.

One of the Institute's objectives is to promote scholarship in peace and security matters. The credentials of the participants speak for themselves in this regard, representing expertise and credibility in a wide variety of disciplines. Once again the Institute must make mention of the willing response of the academic community when asked to participate in the project. Often this response was at short notice and involved considerable adjustment of personal schedules.

As noted, scholarly presentations were combined with perspectives from peacekeepers, journalists, engineers, United Nations officials, municipal authorities, government advisors and influential private citizens. This multidisciplinary and combined approach to the study of the Cyprus conflict proved extremely beneficial. Most importantly, it assisted in maintaining a forward looking focus on Visions for the Future.

Another aspect in the success of the project was the international perspective provided by participants representing at least ten different nationalities. This international support served many purposes. It emphasised the interdependent nature of peace and security in the modern world. It illustrated the requirement for Canadians to be knowledgeable and informed on international issues as matters affecting our common

security. International participation also served to reinforce the value to Canada of a developed multi-cultural and pluralistic society -- a society which has developed considerable expertise in moderating conflict and generating adaptive solutions. Finally, the willing support of Cypriots of all communities ensured that the project was not only a balanced study but also a cooperative and interactive experience for all participants.

Members of the Steering Committee whose cultural heritage was Greek, Turkish, Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot were united in support of this aspect of the project. As Canadian citizens, they felt that our example of cooperative federalism and division of powers had relevance to the situation in Cyprus. They appreciated the mechanisms by which consensus and compromise is developed in Canada and felt that similar processes could produce positive results in the Cyprus project. Thus the project was structured to include a widely based Cypriot representation, consisting of people acting in their private capacities.

The forward focus and the interaction which were present throughout the project were supportive of the Institute's mandate to propose policies and ideas for the enhancement of international peace and security. Many of the papers presented contained specific proposals to reduce tensions, promote intercommunal contacts and develop a framework for resolution of the conflict on Cyprus. These proposals were thoroughly considered, analyzed, debated and reformulated during the open discussion periods of the project. This led to continuing informal discussions after the close of daily deliberations. This Working Paper can only record the outlines of proposals tabled and the interactions which took place during the course of the project. It cannot estimate the value for the communities of Cyprus of the opportunity to discuss informally differing perceptions and alternative courses of action. One can only hope that the means exist to continue the cooperation and dialogue present during the project.

A project cannot be judged a success if the papers and proceedings remain as merely archives at the Institute. The project has furthered the Institute's mandate to disseminate information and to encourage public discussion. Normal procedures were followed in the distribution of papers and proceedings to participants. In addition, copies of the workshop and seminar proceedings were distributed to governmental and non-governmental agencies with policy or humanitarian interests in Cyprus. The result has

been a broad circulation of research materials and proposals in the academic, policy and Cypriot communities.

The public awareness and discussion aspects of the Institute's mandate were furthered by some parallel Institute work or sponsored publications. These included an Adelphi Paper on The Problem of Cyprus, a CIIPS Background Paper and a CIIPS Factsheet. The production of this Working Paper also forms part of the overall documentation and distribution strategy to ensure the widest possible public benefit from the project discussions. Other projects underway include a book incorporating major papers presented during the cour of the project.

The initial three Workshops were exploratory in nature. Active press participation was encouraged at the final Seminar. This aspect of the project may also be judged a success. Interviews with Cypriot community representatives and policy advisors received wide coverage. The newsworthiness of these interviews was enhanced by the fortuitous scheduling of the seminar to coincide with meetings at the United Nations in New York concerning the talks between Mr. Vassiliou and Mr. Denktaş. Subsequent to the seminar, research and background material provided by the Institute was used in a number of feature articles in the national press concerning the general issues of peacekeeping and peacemaking. Both Institute staff and seminar participants were interviewed or consulted as part of the research for these articles.

Participants were universal in their appreciation of the opportunity to discuss issues in an informal manner. They felt that although one could not entirely eliminate historical and legal considerations, the contacts and discussions were harmonious and positive. They felt that the social-psychological approach to the problem had perhaps been neglected in the past, and had an important role to play in unofficial community contacts. They were appreciative of the opportunity afforded by the Institute's Cyprus project to bring about these intercommunal contacts. There was also consensus that the dialogue provided by the CIIPS Workshops and Seminar should be continued.

APPENDIX I

WORKSHOP AND SEMINAR PROGRAMMES

PROGRAMME - WORKSHOP I

CYPRUS COMMUNAL CONFLICT AND GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

Thursday, 18 November 1988 (CIIPS Board Room)

09:00 - 09:30 Registration

09:30 - 10:00 Welcoming remarks
Geoffrey Pearson
Ozay Mehmet
Stelios Pneumaticos

10:00 - 12:00 **Social and political origins of the conflict**

Speaker	William Dobell
Discussants	Tozun Bahceli
	Costas Melakopides
Chair	Roger Hill

12:00 - 14:00 **The Canadian Interest in Cyprus**

Speaker	Clay Beattie
Chair	Tozun Oren

14:30 - 16:30 **Constitutions and Government organization**

Speaker	Norma Salem
Discussant	Albert Breton
Chair	Basil Zafiriou

18:30 Cocktails
(Cercle universitaire, 453 Laurier East)

19:00-21:00 Dinner presentation

The Cyprus issue as a regional conflict

Speaker	Ron Fisher
Chair	Dean Wellsman

<u>Friday, 19 November 1988</u> **(CIIPS Board Room)**

09:00 - 12:00 **What went wrong?**

Speaker	Georges Sherry
Discussants	Panos C. Afxentiou
	Ali-Fuat Borovali
Chair	Fen Hampson

12:00 - 14:00 **The United Nations viewpoint on Cyprus: Peacekeeping and Peacemaking**

Speaker	James Holger
Chair	Robert Mitchell

PROGRAMME - WORKSHOP II

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS AND EXTERNAL ISSUES

Friday, 10 February 1989

09:00 - 09:30 Registration

09:30 - 10:00 Welcoming remarks
Bernard Wood
Norma Salem
Ozay Mehmet
Stelios Pneumaticos

10:00 - 12:00 **Communal and domestic politics**

Speakers: Van Coufoudakis, Mümtaz Soysal
Chair: Robert Mitchell

12:00 - 14:00 **The Misunderstanding of Separation**

Speaker: Jim Travers
Chair: Ersin Cogulu

14:00 - 17:00 **Economic Issues**

Speakers: Louis N. Christofides, Ozay Mehmet
Chair: Basil Zafiriou

18:00-18:30 Cocktails (Skyline Hotel -- S26 Room)

18:30-21:30 **The Great Powers and the Strategic Importance of Cyprus**

Speakers Augustus R. Norton
Ellen Laipson
Chair Stelios Pneumaticos

Friday, 11 February 1989

09:00 - 12:00 **Cyprus in Regional Politics**

Speakers Tozun Bahceli
Costas Melakopides
Roger Hill
Chair Dean Wellsman

12:00 - 14:00 **The European Community and the Cyprus Conflict**

Speaker Semih Vaner
Chair Norma Salem

14:40-15.30 Wrap-up Session

Chair Roger Hill

PROGRAMME - WORKSHOP III

CYPRUS: A CASE STUDY FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Thursday, 14 April 1989 (CIIPS Board Room)

09:00-09:30 Registration

09:30-10:00 Welcoming remarks
Bernard Wood
Norma Salem
Ozay Mehmet
Stelios Pneumaticos

10:00-12:00 **Conflict management and conflict resolution: theory and application**

Speaker Brian Mandell
Discussants Herbert Kelman
Peter Loizos
Vamik Volkan
Chair Norma Salem

12:00-14:00 **Alternative Perspectives on a Settlement**

Speaker Constantin A. Stephanou
Chair Kevser Taymaz

14:00-17:00 **Preconditions for a viable federal system**

Speakers Alain Gagnon
Robert Jackson
Jean-Luc Pepin
Chair Roger Hill

18:30	Cocktails, Casa Calarco Restaurant, Ottawa	
19:00-21:30	Working at Cooperation	
	Speaker	Alastair Robertson
	Chair	Ozay Mehmet

Friday, 15 April 1989

09:00-11:00	Where are we?	
	Speakers	Elias Georgiades
		Rustem Tatar
	Chair	Basil Zafiriou

Lunch Round-table Discussion

12:00-14:00	Where do we go from here? the United Nations Perspective	
	Speakers	James Holger
		James O.C. Jonah
		Indar Jit Rikhye
	Chair	Stelios Pneumaticos

PROGRAMME - SEMINAR

CYPRUS: VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Thursday, 29 June 1989 Skyline Hotel (Top of the Hill Room)

08:30	Coffee and croissants	
09:00-09:30	Welcoming remarks	
		Bernard Wood
		Ozay Mehmet
		Robert Mitchell
09:30-10:00	Overview of the three workshops and procedures for next day	
		Norma Salem
10:00-10:15	Coffee break	
10:15-12:30	**Reconciliation and a Cypriot Political Identity**	
	Speakers	Adamantia Pollis
		Vamik Volkan
		Zenon Stavrinides
		Ahmet Gazioğlu
	Chair	Robert Mitchell
12:30-13:00	Buffet-Luncheon	
13:00-14:30	**Cyprus and peace in the region**	
	Speaker	Alex Morrison
	Chair	Robert Mitchell
14:00-14:45	Coffee break	

14:45-17:00 **Economic potential of Cyprus: Regional, EC and beyond**

Speakers Semih Vaner
Constantin Stephanou
Ahmet Aker
Costas Apostolides

Chair Ozay Mehmet

18:30-19:00 Cocktails (Top of the Hill)

19:00-21:30 Dinner

Cooperation in action

Speakers Mustafa Akinci
Lellos Demetriades

Chair Roger Hill

Friday, 30 June **(the Convention Floor)**

09:00-09:30 Coffee and croissants

09:30-12:30 4 separate workshops

1) **Cyprus as an example of nation-building in a bicommunal context (York Room)**
Chair Ron Fisher

2) **Cyprus as a regional problem with global implications (Seigniory Room)**
Chair Ellen Laipson

3) **Peacekeeping and Peacemaking (Laurentian Room)**
Chair John Halstead

4) **Economics & Peacebuilding (Confederation Room)**
Chair John Sigler

10:45-11:00 Coffee break for all workshops

11:00-12:30 Workshops continue

12:30-13:00 Buffet-Luncheon in the Top of the Hill Room

13:00-14:30 (Top of the Hill Room)

Elections in Turkey and Greece and their implications for Cyprus

Speakers Mümtaz Soysal
Byron Theodoropoulos

Chair Bernard Wood

14:30-14:45 Coffee break

14:45-16:00 Wrap-up Plenary

Chair: Roger Hill

APPENDIX II

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS (ALPHABETICALLY)
PRESENT AT EITHER WORKSHOP I, II, III, OR FINAL SEMINAR

Panos C. AFXENTIOU, Canada
Ahmet AKER, Cyprus
Mustapha AKINCI, Cyprus
Achilles ANTONIADES, Cyprus
Costas APOSTOLIDES, Cyprus
Michael ATTALIDES, Cyprus
Tozun BAHCELI, Canada
William BARTON, Canada
BGen. Clayton BEATTIE, Canada
Major Robert BLACK, Canada
Ali-Fuat BOROVALI, Canada
Albert BRETON, Canada
Joan BROUGHTON, Canada
Ergin CAMLIOGLU, Canada
Vedat CELIK, Cyprus
Louis CHRISTOFIDES, Canada
Van COUFOUDAKIS, United States
Gordon CULLINGHAM, Canada
Lellos DEMETRIADES, Cyprus
Mustafa DILAVER, Canada
William M. DOBELL, Canada
Captain J. R. FERRON, Canada
Ron FISHER, Canada
Alain GAGNON, Canada
Ahmet GAZIOGLU, Cyprus
Elias GEORGIADES, Cyprus
Nancy GORDON, Canada
Robert GRAVELLE, Canada
John HALSTEAD, Canada
Douglas HAMLIN, Canada
Fen HAMPSON, Canada
Aydin HASAN, Canada
Roger HILL, Canada
Ben HOFFMAN, Canada
James HOLGER, United Nations
Koncay HUSEYIN, Canada
Major R. M. HUTCHINS, Canada
Robert JACKSON, Canada
James JONAH, United Nations
Mehmet KADIR, Canada
Costas KAPSALIS, Canada
Kemal KARPAT, United States
Herbert KELMAN, United States
Rose KELMAN, United States
Dimitri KITSIKIS, Canada
François LAFRENIERE, Canada

Ellen LAIPSON, United States
Peter LOIZOS, United Kingdom
Robert MCDONALD, Canada (resident in U.K.)
Brian MANDELL, Canada
Gabrielle MATHIEU, Canada
Ozay MEHMET, Canada
Costas MELAKOPIDES, Canada
Major General Clive MILNER, UNFICYP Designate Commander, Canada
Colonel Robert MITCHELL, Canada
Fauzya MOORE, Canada
Alex MORRISON, Canada
Augustus R. NORTON, United States
Tuncer I. OREN, Canada
M. P. PAIDOUSSIS, Canada
Michael PALAIOLOGOU, Canada
Jean-Luc PEPIN, Canada
S. PERRAKIS, Canada
Stelios PNEUMATICOS, Canada
Adamantia POLLIS, United States
Gerald REDMOND, Canada
General Indar Jit RIKHYE, India (resident in U.S.)
Shane ROBERTS, Canada
Alastair ROBERTSON, Canada (resident in Cyprus)
Norma SALEM, Canada
Georges L. SHERRY, United States
John SIGLER, Canada
Mümtaz SOYSAL, Turkey
Zenon STAVRINIDES, United Kingdom
Constantin STEPHANOU, Greece
Philip STODDARD, United States
Lisa SVOBODA, Canada
Charles SVOBODA, Canada
Rustem TATAR, Cyprus
Kevser TAYMAZ, Canada
Byron THEODOROPOULOS, Greece
Jim TRAVERS, Canada
Constantin TRYPHON, Canada
Semih VANER, France
Costas VARKARIS, Canada
Vamik VOLKAN, United States
Colonel Dean WELLSMAN, Canada
Bernard WOOD, Canada
Basil ZAFIRIOU, Canada